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Sequential games under positional uncertainty
Christopher D. Gibson
This dissertation focuses on sequential games of imperfect information. I study settings
in which not only do agents face imperfect information in the traditional sense of not
possessing all payoff-relevant information, but they also face uncertainty about their position
of movement in the sequence. I have utilized this framework to study financial investment
decisions by individuals, production decisions by firms, and implications on information
aggregation in observational learning.
In order to study production decisions by firms I utilize a Stackelberg oligopoly model
with a stochastic consumer demand. In this setting firms do not know their position of
movement, and as a result of the stochastic demand they cannot infer from the prevailing
price if another firm has yet entered the market. I find that as a result of uncertainty firms
produce a higher quantity than they otherwise would have, resulting in a more competitive
outcome. In fact, as the number of firms in the market increases, with positional uncertainty
the equilibrium quantity actually exceeds the perfectly competitive quantity.
I then investigate the impact of positional uncertainty when agents must choose levels of
investment in a financial asset. Investors receive a signal about the value of the asset but
are not necessarily aware of their position in the sequence of investors. As a result, they are
unsure to what extent the signal they receive represents profit-relevant information, or if the
signal is “stale” in the sense that the information has been incorporated into the price by
other investors. This results in more cautious levels of investment, and an asset price that
does not represent the true underlying value.
To study the behavioral aspects of financial investment, I introduce in this model a notion
of confidence. While much work in the area of behavioral finance has studied the role of
confidence over the accuracy of information, my interest is in confidence over the timing of
information. I define an agent as overconfident if they believe they are more likely to have
received the signal earlier than other agents, and are thus more likely to be early investors.
The effect of overconfidence can overwhelm the cautious nature of positionally uncertain
investors, even potentially leading to an overreaction to information. This effect can explain
overvaluation of assets and volatility of prices in response to information.
In a model of observational learning, limited information about the history of actions
slows the integration of information. However, I show that in the limit, even in the presence of
limited histories complete learning occurs. In the environment of limited access to historical
information I introduce uncertainty over position of action. This uncertainty even further
dampens the process of learning from a welfare standpoint, but as the number of agents
grows large complete learning still obtains in the limit for all levels of uncertainty.
The common finding in all these settings is that uncertainty about the order of action
causes agents to be cautious about exploiting profitable opportunities. In the case of
oligopoly this leads to more competitive outcomes, whereas in the cases of investment and
social learning uncertainty leads to less effective information aggregation.
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Chapter 1
Sequential quantity setting under
positional uncertainty
Abstract: In a Stackelberg oligopoly setting two firms set quantity without
knowing whether they are the first or second in the market. I find that with a
common prior positional uncertainty always leads to a more competitive level of
quantity. This finding is exacerbated when firms do not share a common prior
and the sum of their prior beliefs of moving first exceeds unity. Even in the
presence of a common prior and many identical firms as the number of firms
increases the equilibrium quantity in the presence of positional uncertainty can
exceed that of perfect competition.
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1.1 Introduction
Sequential models of firms deciding on whether to enter a market and the quantity to
produce are as natural as the idea of competition itself. Under the assumption of free
entry, firms look at the prevailing price and incumbent firms and enter if there are profitable
opportunities. The sequential model has been extensively used to study the behavior of
oligopolies, sequential quantity setting a` la Stackelberg serving as the workhorse in this
area. The standard result is that the leading firm anticipates the reaction of the following
firm, enabling it to suppress downstream quantity and produce more than if they moved
simultaneously.
The Stackelberg leader has a first-mover advantage because it can commit to a quantity
before another firm enters the market. But of course this advantage depends on the leader
knowing they are the leader. Likewise, the quantity decision of the following firm depends
on their awareness that they are the follower. In practice this assumption may not withstand
scrutiny, either in the case of duopoly or an arbitrary oligopoly setting. Since minimal effort
would be required to determine whether there is an incumbent firm, the scrutiny would
not target whether a firm knows if it is a follower. Rather, a firm may not know if it is
a leader. That is, a firm deciding on quantity in a certain period may be unsure if a new
entrant will subsequently infuse the market with supply, thereby introducing uncertainty to
the profit-maximizing decision of the initial firm.
Notice that the strategic element of the Stackelberg model of oligopolistic competition
begins and ends with the leading firm. The following firm merely takes the residual demand
and sets quantity q to maximize profit subject to p(q) = a− bq1 − bq. As far as the follower
is concerned, they behave as a monopoly facing linear demand with intercept a′ = a − bq1.
However, if the downstream firm believes there may be yet another follower, the problem
becomes game theoretic with the follower responding to linear demand with intercept a′′ =
2
a′ − bq2 after downstream firm 2 sets quantity q2. If there is any possibility of another firm
entering a market, each firm essentially plays a Stackelberg competition game as a mix of a
leader and a follower.
We will use a basic linear demand to model a Stackelberg competition setting. Two firms
will be unsure of their position as leader or follower, but will face a prevailing market price
p which is either the demand intercept p = a (if they are the Stackelberg leader), or the
residual price after the leader p = a − bq1 (if they are the follower). In order that position
cannot be perfectly inferred from the prevailing price, demand intercept a will be stochastic.
The improper uniform distribution a ∼ U [0,∞] will be the focus of analysis but the results
apply to other distributions as well.
1.2 Related Literature
To our knowledge no work has yet undertaken the study of sequential quantity setting in
oligopoly markets with uncertainty over position. However, there has been much work on
uncertainty in oligopoly markets with quantity setting firms, mostly focused on uncertainty
over demand.
Gal-Or (1985) presents a model of linear demand with a normally distributed intercept,
about which each firm receives a private noisy signal [4]. She shows that firms choosing
quantity simultaneously after receiving informative signals have no incentive to share their
private information about the demand intercept with other firms. Vives (1984) examines the
case of heterogenous goods, confirming the result of Gal-Or if goods are complements but
shows that information sharing is a dominant strategy if they are substitutes [6].
Other studies consider sequential quantity setting with stochastic demand. De Wolf
and Smeers investigate a two period setting in which a Stackelberg leader chooses quantity
without knowing the demand intercept, and a group of firms choose quantity simultaneously
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in the second period after demand has resolved [1]. DeMiguel and Xu generalize this to
multiple Stackelberg leaders choosing quantity simultanously in the first period, and they
identify conditions under which a unique equilibrium exists [2].
Ferreira and Ferreira (2009) study a two-period stochastic demand environment in which
firms have a choice of which period to move. They identify conditions on the resolution
of uncertainty in which a sequential decision is preferred to a simultanous decision. If
uncertainty is high and it is resolved in the second period, the first-mover advantage reverses,
favoring the following firm that faces no uncertainty.
1.3 The model
We consider a multi-period market in which informed market participants (firms) receive
signals and trade according to the information they infer from these signals. Each firm sets
quantity in a market with linear demand p(q) = p0− b · q, with p0 determined stochastically
from some distribution F over [0,∞] so that Pr(p0 ≤ p) = F (p) for all p ∈ [0,∞]. Then given
cost of production c(q) and the order in which they move, firms set quantity to maximize
profit. We will assume that cost of production takes the form c(q) = c · q2.
Due to the stochastic nature of demand, however, the order in which firms set quantity is
unknown. When deciding on the quantity they wish to produce, firms only see the prevailing
market price. This price could be the result of the stochastic draw p0 (in the case that the
firm moves first), or could be the residual price after quantity is set by another firm (in the
case that the firm moves second).
While the stochastic demand intercept makes it impossible for either firm to perfectly
infer their order of play, each has a prior belief Pr(First) = µ that they are the first mover.
Upon seeing the price p, firms use Bayesian updating to infer their posterior probability
γ(p) = Pr(First|p) of being the first mover. In order to calculate this posterior then, they
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must weight the probability that they are seeing the price p = p0 as the first mover, or if
they are seeing the residual price p = p0 − b · q1 as the second mover.
In order to capture the role position plays in the strategic interaction it is useful to focus
on the timing of the game.
t=0: The leading firm observes price p0 ∼ F and decides on q1.
t=1: (i) The leading firm collects profits q1(p0 − bq1)− c · q21.
(ii) The following firm observes price p1 = p0 − bq1 and chooses q2.
t=2: Firm i collects profit qi(p0 − b(q1 + q2))− c · q2i for i = 1, 2.
We will typically be looking at games of two firms, a leader and a follower, but our
sequential quantity game in general takes the following form.
Definition 1.1. Let ΛN(F ) = (N,F, µi)
N
i=1 denote an N-firm sequential entry oligopoly where
firms face linear demand p0−bQ, p0 ∈ [0,∞) given by distribution F (·), and firm i has prior
belief µji of entering the market in position j.
In the case of N = 2, if q∗(p − b · q) is the best response for the follower to quantity q,
expected profit is
pi(p, q) = γ(p)
{
q(p− b · q)− c · q2 + [q(p− b(q + q∗(p− b · q)))− c · q2]}
+ (1− γ(p))[q(p− b · q)− c · q2]
The posterior γ(p) of setting quantity first can equivalently be viewed as the probability that
another period will occur and the following firm will best respond to this quantity setting.
With this interpretation, the profit reduces to the intuitive form
pi(p, q) = q(p− b · q)− c · q2 + γ(p) · q[p− b(q + q∗(p− b · q))− c · q2]
= (1 + γ(p))(q(p− b · q)− c · q2)− γ(p) · bqq∗(p− b · q)
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Given the objective function each firm seeks to maximize, the standard notion of equilibrium
follows naturally.
Definition 1.2. An equilibrium of the game Λ2(F ) is a function q
∗
i (·), i = 1, 2 such that for
all p, q∗i (p) solves
qi = arg max
q
q(p− b · q)− c · q2 + γ(p) · q[p− b(q + q∗(p− b · q))− c · q2]
1.3.1 The case of no uncertainty
To fix ideas we can look no further than the extreme cases where there is no uncertainty
(γ(p) = 0 or γ(p) = 1). This is the reduced game form Λ2(δp(p0)), where δp(p0) is the
Dirac measure that has mass only on p = p0. In this extreme, each firm knows which is
the quantity leader and which is the follower, so that the market reduces to the familiar
Stackelberg oligopoly setting. Through backward induction, the first mover solves
max
q1
q(p− b · q)− c · q2 + q[p− b(q + q∗(p− b · q))− c · q2]
where q2(p) maximizes q2((p0 − b · q1) − q2(b + c)). Solving this system of equations the




2(3b2 + 8bc+ 4c2)
)
and q2 = p0
(
3b2 + 12bc+ 8c2
4(b+ c)(3b2 + 8bc+ 4c2)
)
1.4 Introducing uncertainty: A uniform intercept
Now return to the case of an uncertain linear demand, and therefore an uncertain order of
quantity setting. The linear demand intercept p0 is distributed over [0,∞) according to the
distribution F . Now, however, suppose that every demand intercept p0 ∈ [0,∞] is equally
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likely, so that F is the improper uniform distribution.
Apart from the technical tractability the improper uniform distribution offers, we will
see that there are compelling reasons to analyze this case. Not least of these reasons is
that without additional information about the linear demand, each firm has no reason to
believe any initial price p0 to be more likely than any other. Moreover, while this particular
distribution over p0 sacrifices some generality, we will see later that the loss of generality is
actually minimal. Not only is the uniform distribution the limiting case of many distributions
for p0 that may be of interest, but the cases short of the limits are locally well approximated
by the normal distribution with little error as is demonstrated in section 4.
In order to determine the equilibrium in the uniform case it is necessary to first characterize
the posterior γ(p) of being the first mover under this distribution.
Lemma 1.1. In the Stackelberg game Λ2(U [0,∞)), let γ(p) = Pr(First|p) be the posterior
probability of being first upon observing price p and Pr(First) = µ the prior probability.
Then in a pure strategy equilibrium, γ(p) ∈ {0, µ, 1}.
This lemma shows that if any point is equally likely to be the initial price p0 and if the
observed p is a possible residual price from some initial p0, then it is equally likely that price
p is observed by a first mover or a second mover, so the posterior collapses to the prior µ.
The only cases in which the posterior will not be the prior is if either p cannot be the residual
price from any initial p0, so price p is a “hole,” or if p is a “mass point” and as such is the
residual price of a non-zero mass of initial p0.
In this case that p is a hole and there is no possible initial price such that p0−b·q∗(p0) = p,
then the probability of being a follower is zero so a firm observing the price p knows they must
be the first mover and γ(p) = 1. In the case that p is a mass point, there are uncountably
infinitely many initial prices p0 such that p0 − b · q∗(p0) = p, and only one possible way for
p to be the initial price. As such this mass overwhelms the probability of being the first
mover, so that the posterior is γ(p) = 0.
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These equilibrium pathologies involving holes or mass points in the support of p−b ·q∗(p)
both complicate equilibrium analysis and detract from its interest in describing reasonable
market behavior. As such we will focus on an equilibrium devoid of such cases in order to
focus on firms’ reactions to market variables instead of abstract equilibrium considerations.
In doing so we will highlight the interactions that result from a multi-period market with
positional uncertainty, and how firms respond to beliefs of their own position as well as their
beliefs over other firms’ beliefs.
Given the absence of holes or mass points in the distribution, the posterior γ(p) = µ for
all values of p > 0. This leads to a natural equilibrium result.
Proposition 1.1. In the Stackelberg game Λ2(U [0,∞)) such that p0 is distributed according
to the improper uniform distribution, a linear equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1 states that for a given firm i there is a constant ki such that q
∗
i (p) = kip.
But to determine exactly what form this constant takes more needs to be said of the beliefs
of each firm. In particular, we know each firm has some prior µ, but we have not yet
considered how these priors may relate to one another. If both firms have identical structures
and information it may be natural to assume they have identical priors as well. If firms’
structures are not identical but their information over this asymmetry is shared, then they
may not have identical priors but instead a common prior in that the sum of prior beliefs
still sum to one. In fact the equilibrium composition and comparative statics will differ
depending on how firms form these beliefs, differences that will be revealed in turn.
1.4.1 Identical priors
In the case of identical priors if we denote Pri(First) = µi, then µi = µj = µ and the linear
equilibrium takes simple form.
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Figure 1.1: Plot of k with
identical priors, b=1, and
c=1/2
Figure 1.2: Total quantity
with identical priors, b=1,
and c=1/2
Proposition 1.2. If priors are identical so that µi = µj = µ, then a linear equilibrium of
Λ2(U [0,∞)) exists and takes the form q∗(p) = k · p for all p > 0 with
k =
b(2 + 3µ) + 2c(1 + µ)−√(b(µ+ 2) + 2c(µ+ 1))2 − 8bcµ(µ+ 1)
4b2µ
It can be shown that for all values of parameters b and c, equilibrium parameter k is
decreasing in prior belief µ. This is to be expected, as the prior µ is also the posterior γ(p)
of being the first mover. For a given price p, as the probability of being first increases,
by definition the probability of a subsequent firm setting quantity in the market increases.
Just as in the Stackelberg case the leading firm must reduce the production quantity in
anticipation of the following firm’s quantity reducing price even further, so too does the
increase in the probability µ of a follower add weight to the trade-off between maximizing
profit under current demand versus final demand if another firm were to enter.
Considering the parameters b = 1 and c = 1/2, the linear equilibrium constant takes the





. Total quantity for initial price p0 is then kp0 + k(p0 −
kp0) = p0(2k − k2).
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The plot on the left shows the relationship between prior µ and the linear parameter
k. As described above k is a decreasing function of µ. The figure on the right plots total
quantity as a proportion of initial price (q/p0). As total quantity is a decreasing function of
k it is also to be expected that it too would be a decreasing function of prior belief µ for
the exact same reason. In fact, as the belief of each firm that they move first increases and
each becomes more certain that their production will be followed with an additional infusion
of quantity from the following firm, total quantity in the case of uncertainty actually drops
below the Stackelberg equilibrium with no uncertainty.
Recalling from above that in the Stackelberg equilibrium q1 = p0 · b+2c6b2+8bc+4c2 and q2 =
p0· (3b2+6bc+4c2)4(b+c)(3b2+4bc+2c2) , with the parameters b = 1 and c = 1/2 total quantity q1+q2 = 0.5238·p0.
This total quantity is shown by the horizontal line in the right graph. As can be seen from
this comparison, for low values of µ the total quantity in the uncertain case is higher than in
the case of certainty but for high values of µ this relationship reverses. In fact this pattern
holds for all values of b and c.
While we have no cause to question this pattern at the moment, we will see later there
is indeed plenty of reason to expect that the introduction of uncertainty will lead to a
strictly higher quantity. The Stackelberg case is that in which the order of quantity setting
is commonly known: one agent has prior µ = 1 of moving first and the other has prior
µ = 0. But if the quantity leader had even a little uncertainty of their position, the firm
would have an incentive to increase quantity as the trade-off between maximizing current
and final demand has shifted toward current. If at the same time the quantity follower had
an equal amount of uncertainty in their position but in the reverse direction, this firm would
have an incentive to decrease quantity as their quantity setting trade-off has shifted toward
maximizing final demand. If the leading firm were able to anticipate the quantity reduction
of the follower, the leading firm would be incentivized to even further increase quantity. And
so forth.
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While the end result of this iterative loop of backward induction is unclear in terms of
how total quantity is effected, it is at least clear that being able to anticipate the rival firm’s
response to a new prior will mitigate the declining total quantity as µ increases. In the case of
identical priors this anticipation fails because firms have − and expect the other firm to have
− the exact same prior. Thus when their own prior changes each firm expects the prior of the
other to change in exactly the same way. Barring the case where µ = 1/2, the identical prior
assumption comes with it the untenable shared belief that the total probability of moving
first could exceed or fall short of unity, and moreover that firms are aware that they share
this belief.
1.4.2 A common prior
The case of identical priors provided a simple solution characterizing the linear equilibrium
that allowed for the analysis of firm behavior in the presence of uncertainty and how behavior
changes with beliefs about their position of quantity setting. But valuable as a foothold into
the problem at hand, the assumption that firms have exactly the same belief of moving first
and are aware of this shared contradiction of probability theory seems an unlikely reality in
which otherwise rational firms might operate.
In light of this incongruity a more fitting environment might be one in which firms
correctly anticipate the rival firm’s prior belief in relation to their own. The assumption
that gives us this belief congruity is the common prior assumption. Defined in the usual way
the common prior imposes the following structure on how the prior belief of each firm relate
to one another.
Definition 1.3. Firms i and j share a common prior if µi + µj = 1.
The common prior assumption is useful because not only do priors beliefs accord with
probability theory under this structure but also it introduces a consistency of beliefs that
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would be expected of rational profit-maximizing firms. From a technical standpoint a market
in which firms may have different beliefs µ introduces a layer of complication to firms’
interaction, but we can still find a linear equilibrium, one with notably more desirable and
realistic properties.
Proposition 1.3. If firms have a common prior so that µi+µj = 1, then a linear equilibrium
of Λ2(U [0,∞)) exists and takes the form q∗(p) = k(µ) ·p for all p > 0 with a linear parameter
k(µ) of the form
k(µ) =
b2(3µ2 + µ− 10) + 8bc(µ+ 1)(µ− 2) + 4c2(µ+ 1)(µ− 2) +√A(b, c, µ)
4b2(1− µ)(b(2 + µ) + 2c(1 + µ))
where
A(b, c, µ) = b4(µ2 − µ− 6)2 + 16b3c(µ4 − 2µ3 − 7µ2 + 8µ+ 12)
+ 8b2c2(7µ4 − 14µ3 − 29µ2 + 36µ+ 44) + 16c3(4b+ c)(µ2 − µ− 2)2
In order to highlight the differences between the equilibrium under a common prior and
that under an identical prior a sketch of the proof is useful. Each firm i solves for an
equilibrium under the assumption that the other firm plays a linear strategy. However now
the linear parameter depends on prior µi, as the prior is no longer the same for both firms.
Firm i solves maxki(µi) pki(µi)[p− pki(µi)p(b+ c)]− bpki(µi)µikj(1−µi). This yields for each
firm a first order condition for ki(µi) and an inferred condition for kj(1 − µi), from which
the constants ki(µi) and kj(µj) can be solved.
As in the previous case − and for the same reason − it can be shown that k is decreasing
in the prior belief µ. As the probability of being first increases, the trade-off between
maximizing current and final demand shifts toward final and quantity is decreased. However
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Figure 1.3: Plot of k with
common/identical priors,
b=1, and c=1/2
Figure 1.4: Total quantity
with common priors, b=1,
and c=1/2
unlike in the previous case, this decrease in quantity is amplified by the common prior
realization that at the same time the prior belief of the other firm decreases, leading to an
increase in quantity in the case of a following quantity setter.





4(2µ+3)(1−µ) . If initial price is p0 and µ1 is the prior belief of
the leading firm, total quantity is k(µ1)p0 +k(1−µ1)(p0− bk(µ1)p0) = p0[k(µ1)+k(1−µ1)−
bk(µ1)k(1− µ1)]
The plot on the left shows the inverse relationship of linear parameter k with µ. Moreover,
this graph highlights the different behavior of the parameter k in the case of a common prior
as compared to an identical prior. The two values of k meet at µ = 0 and µ = 1/2.
when the prior is zero, in both cases the firm acts as a stand alone entity given the price,
maximizing profit by equating marginal revenue and marginal cost, ruling out the possibility
of a following quantity setter. When the prior µ = 1/2 the priors are both identical and
common so the cases overlap.
An increase in the prior will lead to a decrease in quantity as the firm becomes more
confident that there is a follower. But now when µ ∈ (0, 1/2) the parameter k is higher than
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in the case of an identical prior. In this region, while k still decreases with µ, this decrease
is mitigated by the awareness given by the common prior assumption that the rival firm’s
prior is in the higher region (1−µ > 1/2), so that while the rival’s declining belief of having
a follower will lead to a quantity increase, this increase will be much lower than if their prior
were less than 1/2. As a result, under a common prior a firm with µ ∈ (0, 1/2) can afford
less of a decrease in quantity in response to an increase in µ than if their rival shared the
same prior µ ∈ (0, 1/2).
For µ > 1/2 this logic reverses, and now any increase in prior µ is met with an equal
and yet more formidable change in behavior from the rival firm. Equal in the sense that
the rival’s prior will decrease by the same magnitude with which µ increases, but more
formidable in that the rival is in the more quantity-responsive region where 1−µ ∈ (0, 1/2).
Thus increases to the prior µ > 1/2 are exacerbated by the common prior assumption as
compared to the case of identical priors.
The figure on the right shows the total quantity summed across the two periods (2q1 +
q2) in proportion to initial price (q/p0) in the case of a common prior compared with the
Stackelberg case of no uncertainty. Unsurprisingly we see that these cases intersect when
µ = 1, when order is known. More interestingly, it is clear that in the case of uncertainty
with a common prior, the total quantity in the market lies above the certain case for all
values of µ.
As described, this is due to the inverse relationship between prior µ and linear parameter
k, and the joint awareness of how this is influenced by the common prior. For prior µ < 1/2,
an increase in µ causes a decrease in k and the resultant linear quantity. But if at the same
time the rival firm sees an decrease in its own µ, this and a higher residual price left by
the leading firm causes an increase in quantity. These two factors, coupled with the more
precipitous slope of the rival’s parameter k in the high µ region more than compensate for
the initial quantity drop, leading to a total quantity increase. The case of a decrease of
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µ > 1/2 is symmetric from the other firm’s perspective, leading to a peak quantity at the
neutral prior µ = 1/2.
The common prior case characterizes a richer environment in which firms interact in the
case of positional uncertainty. The mutual awareness that the change in a firm’s own prior
must be met with an equal change of the rival’s prior restores a consistency to this interaction
and a strengthening of the explanatory power of the model. The common prior solves the
violations of probability theory suffered by the previously identical prior µ, and highlights a
key result. Introducing uncertainty in the position of quantity setting leads to a
higher total level of production in equilibrium.
This result is intuitive, as a movement away from certainty introduces to the following
firm possibility being the leader, and to the leading firm the possibility of not having a
follower. As we was the decrease in quantity of the former is more than compensated for by
the increase in quantity from the latter, leading to a net increase in total quantity over the
certain case.
For the remainder of the analysis we will focus on the case of the common prior. In
many instances this will not matter as the cases intersect with a neutral prior, a natural
assumption for otherwise identical firms. This assumption becomes even more important in
the case of n > 2 identical firms, where both intuition and tractability call upon the neutral
prior.
1.4.3 The case of N firms
In a market of N > 2 firms, while tractability concerns impede an explicit solution for the
linear equation parameter k the logic is very much the same. In such an environment we
will assume the firms are identical and as such the trivial prior of µ = 1/N is assumed. To
15
















q1(p− b(q1 + q2 + q3))− cq21
)
This can be simplified to q1(p − q1(b + c)) − 13bq1(2q2 + q3). The technical complication
arises from the observation that in a linear equilibrium, q3 = k(p − b(pk + k(p − bpk))),
and iteratively when the market reaches N firms the parameter k must be solved from a
polynomial equation of order N . While an explicit solution is no longer guaranteed the
general case can still be solved implicitly for any N .
Proposition 1.4. For the game ΛN(U [0,∞)) with N ≥ 2 firms and a shared uniform prior
µij = 1/N that firm i chooses quantity after j − 1 predecessors, a linear equilibrium q = kp
is defined implicitly by
(1− 2bk)(1− (1− bk)N) = 2bcNk2
We saw in the case of two firms that the introduction of position uncertainty resulted in a
higher total quantity than if positions are certain. In fact, this is a result that generalizes to
the case of N firms. Moreover since sequential quantity setting always results in a higher level
of production than Cournot oligopoly, sequential quantity setting with positional uncertainty
is too bounded below by Cournot.
The figure below shows the total output in the case of Cournot oligopoly, sequential
quantity with positional uncertainty, and the perfectly competitive outcome (where firms
make zero profit). As expected the case of sequential quantity setting with uncertainty
lies above the simultaneous quantity setting of Cournot. But the surprising result is the
relationship with the perfectly competitive quantity. It is known that Cournot converges to
the perfectly competitive case as the number of firms goes to infinity, but it is striking how
quickly the uncertain case converges. In fact, with the parameters b = 1 and c = 1/2, when
the number of firms is more than 14 the quantity actually surpasses the perfectly competitive
16
outcome.
Figure 1.5: Total quantity for various market structures, b=1 and c=1/2
That the sequential quantity case with uncertainty exceeds the perfectly competitive
outcome gives pause as it must imply that some firms make negative profit. While this is
true, it is not true that all firms make losses, nor is it true than any firm expects losses
ex-ante. It is only the leading firms who make losses, as they produce the most given the
initial price p0, and as such are shouldered with consequences of this low probability event
of being an early quantity setter.
Given the uncertainty in this environment, it is understandable that in the case of low
probability events, an a priori optimal strategy yields losses a posteriori. The possibility of
losses highlights another departure from certainty in quantity setting. Not only does the case
of sequential quantity setting with positional uncertainty converge quickly (even surpassing)
the perfectly competitive outcome, but this convergence comes at the expense of leading
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firms’ profits. While for a low number of firms there is a leading advantage in terms of
profits, when the number of profits grows this advantage switches as the gains from being
a quantity leader are outweighed by proximity to the final price. A leading firm can inject
more quantity into the market than can a following firm, but if the price drops too much (if
too many firms follow), the leader’s high quantity turns out to be too high.
1.5 A generalization: A normal intercept
Previously the intercept p0 that determined the linear demand curve was distributed over
[0,∞) according to the improper uniform distribution so that any initial p0 was equally
likely. As a generalization, suppose now that demand intercept p0 is distributed over [0,∞)
according to the truncated normal distribution N(µ, σ2). For ease of exposition suppose










Notice that finding the equilibrium q∗(p0) which maps p0 into residual price p according
to p = p0 − bq∗(p0) is equivalent to finding the inverse mapping of p to initial price p0
according to p∗0(p) = p + bq
∗(p∗0(p)). This latter mapping is solved as a fixed point problem
but a unique solution will exist as long the mapping p0 7→ p is injective. Then upon seeing
price p, the initial price, or demand intercept, if the firm is the first mover is p, while the
initial price if second is p∗0(p). Then the probability of being first given the observed price p
can be found through Bayesian updating as follows:
γ(p) =
Pr(F ) Pr(p|F )






}+ (1− µ) exp{−p∗0(p)2
2σ2
}
The assumption of a normal distribution is a generalization in the sense that as variance
σ2 increases, the distribution of p0 increasingly resembles the improper uniform distribution,
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converging to it in the limit. However, the updated probability γ(p) of being the first hints
at the complication the normal distribution introduces. This posterior can be reduced to
µ/[µ+(1−µ) exp{−p∗0(p)2−p2
2σ2
}], which makes clear its dependency on the difference p∗0(p)2−p2.
However, as price increases the optimal quantity will increase, leading to an increase in the
difference between initial and residual prices p∗0(p)−p. This alone is not unique to the normal
case, as we saw the same in the uniform case - constant in the case of a uniform intercept
was not the difference between initial and residual prices but the ratio between them.
This problem becomes more complicated because now the rival firm’s optimal response
q∗(p− bq) changes not just on the residual price p− bq, but also with the induced posterior
γ(p − bq). Moreover, since for any quantity q1 the responding firm maximizes q(p − bq1) −
q2(b+ c)− q · bγ(p− bq1)q1, varying q1 will affect the responding firm’s first order condition
with respect to q both linearly and exponentially, so there is no closed form solution to the
original first order condition with respect to q1. This points to an numeric solution.
The positional uncertainty and infinite state space of this problem join to present another
complication: the problem is infinitely recursive. This is in itself is not new but the constant
posterior of the uniform case allowed us to conjecture a linear equilibrium; the dynamic
posterior here suggests a dynamic programming solution. However, the infinite recursiveness
on both sides of the distribution - since for any price p > 0 it is always possible that there
was a leader facing initial price p∗0(p) or will be a follower facing residual price p − bq -
leaves a dynamic programming problem with no initial point. Fortunately under the normal
distribution we can find a “good enough” starting point in the following sense.
Lemma 1.2. In the game Λ2(N) where demand intercept p0 is distributed according to the
truncated normal distribution on the interval [0,∞), then limp→0 γ(p) = µ.
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The essence of this result is that since the posterior takes the form
γ(p) =
µ





then if p∗0(p)→ 0 as p→ 0 then γ(p)→ µ. If this were not the case some ε2 > ε1 > 0 could
be found such that p < ε1 and p0 > ε2 for p0 − bq∗(p0) = p. But this induces a hole in the
range p ∈ (ε1, ε2) so that γ(p) = 0 which by assumption does not exist.
Lemma 1.3. In the game Λ2(N) where demand intercept p0 is distributed according to the
truncated normal distribution on the interval [0,∞) and q∗(·) is an equilibrium, then
limp→∞ γ(p) = 1.














and that as p → ∞ the inducing p∗0(p) must increase in distance so p∗0(p)2 − p2 diverges. If
this were not true then
Then for a small enough initial price p0 it can be assumed with little error that the a
firm will behave as in the na¨ıve case of a uniform prior, assuming the posterior of itself and
any potential follower to be µ and setting the quantity q(p) = k(µ) · p as above. From here,
the best response q∗(p) to any initial p can be determined recursively by choosing a suitably
small starting point p so γ(p) ≈ µ and iterating a finite number of steps.
Consider the case where each firm has prior Pr(F ) = µ. Then for our canonical case
of b = 1 and c = 1/2 let variance σ2 = 1 to start and consider the lower bound for our
numerical approximation of p = 1/100, 000.
For such a small lower bound p we would expect that γ(p) ≈ µ for p near p, and that the
optimal quantities for such prices would approximate k(µ) · p as in the uniform case. Since
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Figure 1.6: Optimal quantity
and price under normal
demand intercept
Figure 1.7: Posterior
probability of first as a
function of observed price
the lowest price player has posterior γ(p) = µ and assumes any follower will have the same,
then by design this holds.
As figure 1.6 shows, the relationship between price and quantity is roughly linear but
not quite. As described, the best response to a low price is approximately p · k(µ), but as p
increases the posterior moves away from γ(p) ≈ µ and approaches γ(p) = 1.
However, the speed of this movement depends on the variance of the signal σ2. As the
variance increases, high prices become less informative of position and the posterior does not
update as much. This leads to the optimal q and k∗(µ) · p coinciding for a larger number of
prices As figure 1.8 shows, while in the case of σ2 = 1 the linear equilibrium with posterior
γ = µ and the optimal quantity under the normal distribution diverged around p = 1, for
σ2 = 100 this difference is only perceptible near p = 100. This corresponds to the slowing of
the posterior γ(p) to update away from µ, as the following graph shows.
Beginning with a prior of µ = 1
4
the speed at which the posterior updates slows significantly.








} , so that limσ2→∞ γ(p) = µ.
Given the stubbornness of γ(p), the assumption of the previous section that price is
distributed uniformly is even more appealing. A uniform price intercept is a good approximation
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Figure 1.8: Effect of normal variance on optimal quantity and price
Figure 1.9: Posterior belief of moving first as a function of price
for small p and large variance σ2, offering credence to the improper uniform distribution as
more than just a tractable choice.
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1.6 Concluding remarks
We have introduced a model of Stackelberg competition in which firms are unsure of their
position as leader or follower. As a result, the probability of a competitor subsequently
responding to quantity causes the downstream firm to reduce output, while the nonzero
probabiltiy of being the follower causes the upstream firm to produce more than if position
were perfectly known. Of these two opposing effects the incentive to increase production
in response to the chance of being the downstream firm outweighs the incentive of the true
follower to restrict quantity.
As a result of this interplay of incentives, uncertainty over position ultimately leads to
a higher level of output in the market and a more competitive outcome for consumers. As
the number of firms increases this difference widens, with the total quantity under positional
uncertainty approaching − in some cases surpassing − quantity under perfect competition.
While the focus of this study was a model in which the stochastic demand intercept
was uniformly distributed. The key feature of the uniform distribution that lends so much
tractability is that since every price is equally likely, no price gives agents any more information
about their position and the belief of being first remains as the prior. The results presented
hold under other distributions, including the truncated normal. Moreover, as the variance of
the intercept increases and the signal becomes less informative, the posterior belief remains
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. A firm observes p which induces a belief γ(p). By Bayesian updating
with prior Pr(First) = µ and given p0 ∼ U [0, a0]
γ(p) =
Pr(p|F ) Pr(F )
Pr(p|F ) Pr(F ) + Pr(S) Pr(p|S)
=
µPr(p|F )














Where because initial price is distributed uniformly f(s) = 1
a0
. The value of the posterior






|s)f(s)dp0 · ds. There are three possibilities
(i) There is no initial p0 such that q
∗(p0) satisfies p = p0 − b · q∗(p0) in which case we
will say p is a hole in the support. If p is a hole then f(q = p0−p
b







|s)f(s)dp0 · ds = 0. Thus if p is a hole in the distribution
γ(p) = 1.




. Suppose the measure of P0 = λ > 0. Also, since we are considering
only full strategies, f(q = p0−p
b







|s)f(s)dp0 · ds ≥
∫
P0
f(s)ds = λ · 1
a
. And since the numerator of γ(p) becomes
arbitrarily small as ε→ 0, γ(p) = 0.











|s)f(s)dp0 · ds = 2ε and γ(p) = µ
Since this holds for all values of a0, it holds for the limiting case of the improper uniform
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distribution as a0 →∞.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since we are looking for a pure strategy equilibrium with an
infinite state space, according to Lemma 1 the posterior γ(p) = µ. Moreover since firms
have an identical prior Pr(F ) = µ, each solves the problem
max
q
(1 + µ)(q · p− q2(b+ c))− µqbq∗(p− b · q)
Conjecture a linear equilibrium so q∗(p) = k · p. Then the maximization problem becomes
max
q
(1 + µ)(q · p− q2(b+ c))− µqbk(p− b · q)











. Isolating k yields
k =
b(2 + 3µ) + 2c(1 + µ)−√(b(µ+ 2) + 2c(µ+ 1))2 − 8bcµ(µ+ 1)
4b2µ
Proof of Proposition 3. As in the previous proposition firms have the posterior γi(p) =
µi, however now µi = 1−µj, where the priors are not necessarily the same. Each firm solves
max
q
(1 + µ)(q · p− q2(b+ c))− µiq · bkj(p− b · q)
Where kj is the assumed constant of the rival firm as a function of their prior. As above this
yields the equation
ki =
1 + µi(1− bkj)
2b(1 + µi(1− bkj)) + 2c(1 + µi)
26
However, unlike the previous case kj is not necessarily equal to ki because they firms might
have different priors. But due to the common prior assumption firm one solves for k1 under
the assumption that
kj =
1 + µj(1− bki)
2b(1 + µj(1− bki)) + 2c(1 + µj)
Solving for k(µ) yields
k(µ) =
b2(3µ2 + µ− 10) + 8bc(µ+ 1)(µ− 2) + 4c2(µ+ 1)(µ− 2) +√A(b, c, µ)
4b2(1− µ)(b(2 + µ) + 2c(1 + µ))
where
A(b, c, µ) = b4(µ2 − µ− 6)2 + 16b3c(µ4 − 2µ3 − 7µ2 + 8µ+ 12)
+ 8b2c2(7µ4 − 14µ3 − 29µ2 + 36µ+ 44) + 16c3(4b+ c)(µ2 − µ− 2)2
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose all other firms play a linear strategy q = k1p. Then
firm i will choose quantity qi = kpi, where pi is the residual price after i − 1 firms set
quantities q1, . . . , qi−1. Then qi+1 = k1pi+1 = k1(pi − bkpi) = k1pi(1 − bk), qi+2 = k1pi+2 =
k1(pi+1 − bk1pi+1) = k1pi+1(1 − bk1) = k1pi(1 − bk1)(1 − bk), and inductively, qi+j = pi(1 −
bk)k1(1− bk1)j−1. If µi is the probability for firm i can be written as

























and imposing that q = kp
= p2
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Solving for the optimal k gives first order condition
p2
{












so that replacing r = 1− bk1,
n∑
m=1
(n−m)(1− bk1)m−1 = nbk1 − 1 + (1− bk1)
n
(bk1)2
so that the first order condition becomes
p2
{
1− 2k(b+ c)− b(1− 2kb)k1
(




Imposing symmetry in the equilibrium so that k = k1 this reduces to
(1− 2kb)(1− (1− kb)n) = 2bcnk2
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Chapter 2
The role of confidence over timing
of investment information
Abstract: I present an investment environment wherein investors demand an
asset based on perfectly informative signals, but face uncertainty about the timing
of their information acquisition. I show that this reduces the demand and price
for every period but that in the limit price as number of periods increases price
converges to the true value of the asset. By introducing a concept of confidence
over the time in which they receive a signal, I show that the impact of uncertainty
can be exaggerated in either a negative or positive direction, with the limit price




Uncertainty is one of the most widely studied phenomena in all of economics. Without
uncertainty, all decisions could be made through a combination of incorporating economically
relevant variables and backward induction, yielding definitive answers and leaving economists
(and people in general) to dedicate themselves to other pursuits. But uncertainty pervades.
Outcomes of investment choices, information quality, and even the preferences of agents all
suffer from the whims of uncertainty. As such, in order to accurately capture behavior the
field of economics must accommodate and incorporate into models the reality of uncertainty
in any form it may take.
One form of uncertainty that has garnered much attention in the realm of financial
investment and firm profit maximizing decisions is over the quality of information. The final
value of an uncertain decision can be found in the outcome into which uncertainty resolves
itself, but when the decision must be made before such resolution the value lies solely in
the quality of information over the possible outcomes. It is no wonder then that the quality
of information is of such interest. But a metric over informational quality misses one of
uncertainty’s most important factors: timing. It is important not only to employ accurate
information in making decisions in the face of uncertainty, but it is perhaps equally important
to employ this information at the appropriate time.
In this paper I introduce a setting in which profit maximizing agents undertake decisions
in the face of uncertainty. However, it is not the quality of information that is uncertain
to agents, but rather the timing with which agents receive this information. To emphasize
the effect of timing on information driven decisions, multiple agents will receive signals at
different times, yet none will be aware of the order in which they receive this profit relevant
information.
In order to isolate the role of positional uncertainty, investors will receive a perfectly
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informative signal about the state of the world, in this case the value of an asset. While
the asset’s valuation is unambiguous, agents will must determine their investment strategies
without knowing their position of movement. That is, they must face the uncertainty of
other investors having already made their decisions, incorporating information into the asset
price, thereby diminishing the value of the informative signal.
Upon a groundwork of behavior under positional uncertainty I build the notion of confidence.
Agents who are equally likely to move in any particular period will be said to suffer from a
confidence bias if they place any weight other than the uniform distribution on their beliefs
of moving in any period. This notion of confidence encompasses both overconfidence, as is
traditionally the focus in the behavioral literature, as well as underconfidence. Overconfidence
will manifest in a type of front-loading of beliefs so that the agent believes it is more likely
they will move earlier than later, expecting that greater gains to investment are possible
than would be so with no such bias. Underconfidence will have the opposite quality, leading
agents to place greater weight on the belief that they move in later periods.
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 2 I will discuss the most closely related
literature; in section 3 I will introduce a basic model of investment; in section 4 I will
introduce uncertainty; in section 5 I develop a notion of confidence that can change based on
agents’ beliefs in equilibrium; section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix
unless they provide useful insight into the decision making process.
2.2 Related literature
Much work has been done on overconfidence in the trading of financial assets. Perhaps
the most closely related work is that of Gervais, Odean (2001) [4]. In this model investors
receive a perfect signal with a fixed probability or pure noise and must update their belief
of receiving the informative signal. Through varying a confidence parameter they show that
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belief of acquiring an informative can either converge to the case of perfect rationality for
low levels of overconfidence, or diverge for high levels of confidence.
This work has many related elements including accounting for the confidence of agents
and a multi-period investment setting. Among the many departures, however, is that here
I investigate the role of confidence over position, not signal acquisition. Agents know they
receive a perfect signal about the value of the asset but have imperfect information about
the period in which they receive it. In addition in their setting agents receive signals and
invest in each period. In order to isolate the role of confidence over positional uncertainty I
restrict attention to one signal although the model generalizes to more frequent signals.
In other works Odean (2008b) shows that overconfidence in investors tends to lead to
excessive trading and lower expected utility. Overconfident agents tend to overreact to
salient information and underreact to trade relevant information, thereby preventing the
information of rational agents from being fully reflected in market price [7]. Barber and
Odean (2001) also find that men trade stocks 45% more than women, a finding hypothesized
to come from overconfidence [1].
This excessive trading and overreaction to salient information is supported by an experiment
comparing traders new to online trading to their previous gains (Barber and Odean 2002)
[2]. It is found that while phone traders tended to beat the market, upon the switch traders
tend to under-perform, a finding unexplained by the reduction in market frictions alone. It
is hypothesized that overconfidence coupled with an increased trading speed cause online
investors to increase their trading volume and reduce their performance.
Other studies show similar effects of confidence in other settings. Through FMRI scans
Peterson (2005) shows that investor overconfidence may be related to reward system activation
in the brain [8]. Handy and Underwood (2005) find that overconfidence increases price
at which managers repurchase share prices [5], a finding backed up empirically by Shu
et.al (2013) [9]. Other studies demonstrate how the salience of news stories can lead to
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overconfidence and excessive trading (Barber, Odean 2008) [3] and that due to loss aversion
traders tend to keep their assets when they suffer large losses disproportionately more often
than when they enjoy small gains (Odean 1998) [6].
2.3 The model
I consider an environment in which agents receive information about the value of a financial
asset. The previous value v0 of the asset is unknown to investors but is assumed to have
already been incorporated into the market price. Agents receive a signal η about how
the value of the asset changes. Agents receive this signal privately and without distortion
but share a prior belief with all market participants that it is drawn from the distribution
η ∼ N(0, σ2).
Agents wish to maximize the difference between the value of the asset and the price they
pay. Upon receiving signal η they know the value of the asset is vt = E[v0] + η, but they
are unaware of the prior value v0. Upon viewing price pt agents will choose their demand
for the asset x in order to maximize E[x(vt − pt)]. Importantly, there will be no short sale
restrictions so that agents can demand a negative amount of the asset.
In addition to not knowing the initial value v0 of the asset, agents are also unaware of
their position of movement. If the agent moves at period t then t − 1 agents have already
had the opportunity to move. In this setting position of movement refers to the time at
which the signal is received, which is to say that if an agent moving at period t sees a price
pt, this price has already had information η incorporated into it by t− 1 other agents.
Notice that both elements of uncertainty are necessary to capture the idea of positional
uncertainty. If the agent knew v0 they could maximize x(v0 +η−pt) without any information
about their position of movement. Likewise if the agent were to know their position, through
backward induction the agent could deduce how much information η was incorporated into
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the price by the previous t− 1 agents.
In addition to the aforementioned informed traders there is a liquidity trader who demands
an amount of the asset every period. This is necessary not only to capture the reality that
investors participate in the market for reasons other than price (e.g. to raise capital or they
are uninformed) but also to guarantee trade in a market with informed investors who present
an information asymmetry for any price setting mechanism. Each period the liquidity trader
will demand zt ∼ N(0,Ω) of the asset, an amount independent of process that yields η and
independent of liquidity demands of other periods. All market participants share common
knowledge of the i.i.d. zt and its independence from η.
Finally there is a market maker that sets the price pt each period. The market maker
knows the prior distribution of η, zt, and their independence from one another. Like the
informed agents the market maker does not know the value v0 of the asset at period 0, but
in period 1 the dissemination of information η introduces the informational asymmetry. To
combat this asymmetry the market maker sets a price each period in order to match the
value vt as closely as possible given current and historical demands for the asset. That is,
pt = E[vt|ωt, ht] where ωt = xt + zt, the sum of demand from the informed and liquidity
traders, and ht = (wi)i<t is the historical series of market demand for each period.
2.3.1 The case of no uncertainty
To gain a foothold into the decision making process faced by investors it is useful to start
with the case of no uncertainty. Moreover, the case without uncertainty will provide a
benchmark against which to compare decision making when agents do not know their position
of movement.
Consider the investment setting as described with T periods and one agent moving in
each period. Each agent knows their position t ≤ T and chooses demand to maximize the
difference between the value of the asset and price per share. To describe how agents make
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this decision, recall that they maximize E[x(vt − pt)]. While vt is perfectly known as agents
know their position of movement, there remains uncertainty in the price.
As we will see the linear equilibrium takes the form pt = pt−1 + λtωt. Since demand
ωt includes liquidity traders that behave randomly, agents cannot perfectly predict price
movements in period t and must take an expectation. The optimal demand then comes from
maximizing E[x(vt − (pt−1 + λt(x + zt)))] = x(E[v0] + η − pt−1 − λtx), where it is assumed
that price information in p0 already contains v0; in fact this assumption can (with some error
induced by the liquidity trader) be verified by the agent through backward induction. The




The market maker sets a price attempting to match the asset’s value, taking into account
noise from the liquidity investor. Then in a linear equilibrium pt = E[v0 + η|βtxt + zt, ht].
In equilibrium the value of βt is known to the market maker so price setting becomes an
exercise in signal extraction with noise zt ∼ N(0,Ω) induced by the liquidity trader and a
prior belief pt−1 − p0 of the value η. This yields an updated estimated value of the asset
pt = pt−1 +λtωt. In this environment the equilibrium values of βt and λt take a simple form.
Proposition 2.1. For T ∈ N ∪ {∞} periods, if each agent knows their position t ≤ T then
there exists a linear equilibrium of the form pt = pt−1 + λtωt, x1 = β1η, and xt = βtη + Zt


















for t > 1, and Zt ∼ N(0, Vt)





η + Z ′t where Z
′
t ∼ N(0, V ′t )
As expected from the investor’s first order condition, the equilibrium demand for the
asset more or less halves each period in proportion to the value of the asset. In fact, for
periods t = 2 and onward demand xt = βtη exactly halves every period. The reason for this
is that in equilibrium β is a ratio of the variance of liquidity trading Ω and of the market
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maker’s inferred variance from the procedure of noise signal updating. In the first period
the market uses prior belief σ2 of the asset’s variance. But thereafter updated variance of
the market maker is constant at Ω
2
. This result actually holds in a more general setting.




is a constant multiple of 1
λ
and for any initial asset variance V0, variance is constant
in all periods t ≥ 2 and takes the form Vt−1 = yΩ
A technical detail that explains the constancy of βt and λt for periods t ≥ 2 to be sure,
the instant convergence of inferred variance is also interesting in its own right. Not only
does this result apply to the present case where agents are aware of their position, but it
also applies when agents face positional uncertainty. This can be seen from the fact that
the term y above can be any function of priors over positions of movement, so as long as y
is constant so too is the inferred variance vt−1. Another surprising feature of the updated
variance is that it is independent of the distribution of signal η, depending only the liquidity
trading variance Ω.
In addition to being an expected consequence of the agent’s first order condition the
result that demand halves in each period also provides insight into the rationality of the
market price updating. In equilibrium the change in price can be expressed as pt − pt−1 =
λt(βtηt + zt) =
1
2t
η + λtzt. In each period the market receives half as much information
as in the prior period so that the rate of information transmission slows. Price is thus a
geometric series save for the error in each period resulting from the presence of liquidity
demands. While liquidity traders introduce noise that prevents the market maker from
perfectly inferring the value of η, thereby enabling an equilibrium in pure strategies, their
presence also hinders the interpretation of price as the true value of the asset even at the
limit. However, the fact that liquidity noise has mean zero allows us to at least comment on
its expectation.
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η and limt→∞ E[pt] = p0 + η.
The form of the error Z ′t is not important from the perspective of interpreting the price
or its expectation. It will always introduce randomness that prevents the market price from
perfectly reflecting the underlying value of the asset, but will always be present for reasons
described above. This error does, however, take a convenient form.
Proposition 2.2. In the above equilibrium for which T ∈ N ∪ {∞} periods and each agent















λizi for t > 1. Moreover












As the formulation of Zt makes clear, each period noise from all previous periods becomes
less relevant to price. But even though the Zt follows a process in proportion to a geometric
sum there is always λtzt incorporated in price pt, preventing the price from converging to
the true value of the asset. Fortunately a metric that is often referenced as an indication of
an asset’s value is the moving average, and with good reason.
Proposition 2.3. In the above equilibrium for which T ∈ N ∪ {∞} periods and each agent
knows their position t ≤ T , plimT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 pt = p0 + η.
As this proposition shows, the price may not converge to the true value of the asset but
the moving average converges in probability. So in a probabilistic sense the market fully
incorporates the value η.
2.4 Introducing uncertainty
Now suppose agents face uncertainty over their position over movement, but suppose that




As above suppose investors invest in an asset that evolves according to an unobservable
process vt+1 = vt + ηt+1 but in different periods each receives the same signal η about the
process. Again there is a liquidity investor who demands zt ∼ N(0,Ω) independent of ηt.
In the case of two agents the common prior assumption provides that if agent 1 has
prior belief Pr1(F ) = γ1 of moving first then it anticipates that agent 2 has prior belief
Pr2(F ) = 1− γ1. The agent receives a signal η about the how the value of the asset evolves
but does not know the initial valuation and thus cannot infer if this valuation is already
incorporated in price. With two agents, each can either be first or second and each observes
a price p which may or may not incorporate the information η. Supposing pt is the price
before information enters the market,
(i) If the agent is first then the observed price p = pt
(ii) If the agent is second then the observed price p = pt+λt+1yt+1, where yt+1 was demand
from the first moving agent.
The difference between the first price p and the second is that the second price already
incorporates information about the asset’s value from the first agent. Thus the remaining
profit left to the second mover is less because the price relative the the value of the asset is
higher. Given that the agent has no prior information about the value of the asset it must
be assumed that pt = E[vt]. Then agents solve
max
x
xE[vt+1 − pt+1] = max
x
xE[vt+1 − (p+ λt+1ωt+1)]
= max
x
x · γE[vt + ηt+1 − (pt + λt+1ωt+1)] + max
x
x · (1− γ)E[vt + ηt+1 − (pt + λtyt + λt+1ωt+1)]
= max
x
x · γ(η − λt+1x)− x · (1− γ)(η − λt+1x− λtyt)
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where yt is the expected quantity of the first mover in the event this agent is in fact choosing
second. The profit maximization problem then becomes maxx x · (η−λt+1x− (1−γ)λtE[y]).
Notice that while p = pt or p = pt−λtyt, the maximization function does not contain the
term p. This is because the agent does not know price pt or value vt, but on the expectation
the best guess is that the market sets price pt = E[vt]. Then these two terms cancel and the
difference we are left with is that between the future valuation and current price.
Notice also that the linear price parameter λt is potentially different in every period. This
is a result of the fact that the market maker’s belief Vt of the informative signal η updates
each period. However according to Lemma 1 the variance Vt is constant for all t ≥ 2 as
long as βt is constant. Given that this is the sort of equilibrium of interest we will make the
simplifying assumption that λt is constant for all t.
Assumption 2.1. In any linear equilibrium price of the form pt = αt + λtωt where ωt is
total market demand and αt is a period specific constant, assume that λt = λ for all t.
With this additional assumption we are ready to characterize an equilibrium for two
agents.
Proposition 2.4. For T = 2 periods and agents do not know their position but have prior
beliefs γ1 and γ2 and assume a common prior then there exists a linear equilibrium of the
form pt = p0(1 − ϕ) + ϕpt−1 + λωt where p0 is the price before information η entered the
market, x1 = β1(γ1)η and x2 = β2(γ2)η with
βi(γi) =
2− ϕ(1− γi)





ϕ(1− ϕ) and ϕ2 + 3ϕ− 2 = 0 (ϕ ≈ 0.562)
From this result we can see the manner in which information about the asset’s value
translates into movements in the price. In equilibrium, p2 = p0 + λ(ϕx1 + x2) + λ(ϕz1 + z2).
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Then
E[p2] = λ(ϕβ1η + β2η) =
{
ϕ[2− ϕ(1− γ1)]





and if agents share a common prior so that γ1 = 1− γ2 this reduces to
=
[






where the last equality comes from the fact that ϕ2 + 3ϕ = 2.
Figure 2.1: Final price p2 as a function of prior γ1
As figure 3.8 shows, as the common prior γ1 increases, the degree to which the price
reflects the informational content of demand diminishes. This is due to the weight ϕ on the
demand of the first mover and the inability of the market maker to respond to changes in
the common prior due to the information asymmetry.
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2.4.2 T identical agents
We can generalize this case to one in which there are T agents, each receiving the signal η
in a different period t ≤ T and sharing a common prior over their position of movement. A
natural prior is uniform, where each agent believes that their probability of moving in period
t ≤ T is Pr(t) = 1
T
for all periods. Furthermore, each agent believes that all other agents
share this common prior.
As in the case of no uncertainty we will find a linear equilibrium in demand ωt. Now,
however, since agents do not know if the price they see is the original valuation or the price
after t−1 periods of agents acting on information η, they will not assign a unit value to pt−1.
They weight the previous price based on their beliefs Pr(t) of moving in every t and their
beliefs about other agents’ actions. To compensate for this, in equilibrium price at period t
will be a weight ϕ < 1 of the previous period price and current demand ωt.
To see why this is, consider the pricing decision of the market maker. As before, each
agent demands x = E[v0]+η−pt−1
2λ
but now, with equal probability pt−1 could have information
η incorporated in any number of periods t ≤ T − 1. Thus the agent will shade their demand
down by the expected amount of information already incorporated into the price. Each




E[βη|βη + zt] = p0 + Ω(pt−1−p0)+βV ωtΩ+β2V so that pt = p0(1 − ϕ) + ϕpt−1 + λωt where
ϕ = Ω
Ω+β2V
and λ = βV
Ω+β2V
.
With this formulation price in each period is a ϕ discounted sum of previous demands
plus initial price. If the agent moves in the second period price is p1 = p0 +λω1. If the agent
moves in the third period then price is p2 = p0 +λω2 +ϕλω1. Inductively if the agent moves
in period t then t− 1 agents move before and pt−1 = p0 +
∑t−1
i=1 λϕ
(t−1)−iωi. So to the agent,
without knowledge of initial value v0, pt−1 is a combination of demand in previous periods,
containing p0 = E[v0]. This gives rise to a linear equilibrium of the following form.
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Proposition 2.5. For T ∈ N ∪ {∞} periods, if agents do not know their position but have
a uniform and common prior belief over t ≤ T then there exists a linear equilibrium of the
form pt = p0(1 − ϕ) + ϕpt−1 + λωt where p0 is the price before information η enters the






ϕ(1− ϕ), and ϕ = 1− ϕ(1− ϕ
T )
T (1− ϕ)
This equilibrium can be solved down to the variable ϕ which itself cannot be solved for
explicitly. Yet it still provides interesting insight. The most obvious result to note is that
this equilibrium does not depend on liquidity noise Ω. This comes from the fact that the
updated variance of η converges immediately as described above, so βλ need not include this
term. As the market maker gains information from demand each period, since the variance of
η does not change, noise introduced by the liquidity traders offers no additional information.
Equilibrium behavior for the informed agents also accords closely to what we would
expect. Since agents do not know which of the T positions they occupy when they choose
their investment strategies, they tend to behave more cautiously than in the case with no
uncertainty.
This figure compares the price for each number of time periods in the certain and
uncertain cases, given that the true value of η is 1 and p0 = 0. As we can see comparing the
cases of certainty with uncertainty, as the number of periods T increases the information η
is more quickly incorporated into the price of the asset in the certain case. Indeed in the
certain case information is integrated at the geometric rate 1 − 1
2
t
, while in the uncertain
case the rate is not quite as fast.
While slower than in the case of certainty, we can say something about the rate of
convergence to the true value η as the following proposition describes.
Proposition 2.6. In the above equilibrium for which T ∈ N∪ {∞} and agents do not know
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Figure 2.2: Final market price for certain and uncertain position
their position but have a uniform and common prior belief over t ≤ T , E[pt] = p0 + η(1−ϕt)
In the case of positional uncertainty, for every number of possible time periods the price
is lower than if position of movement were certain, but this price too converges at a (pseudo)
geometric rate of 1−ϕt, with ϕ as defined above. The difference is that the ϕ is higher than
the 1
2
of the certain case for all t, and in fact limt→∞ ϕ = 1. However, since price depends on
ϕt it is this term whose convergence determines the integration of signal η into the price as
the number of periods T increases. As the figure makes clear this term indeed does converge
to zero.
Proposition 2.7. In the above equilibrium for which T ∈ N∪ {∞} and agents do not know





t=1 pt = p0 + η.
As Proposition 7 describes we have an analogous limit result in the case of positional
uncertainty - albeit with a slower rate of convergence. This slower convergence reflects the
fact that symmetric agents are more cautious in acting on their signal as there may be up
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to T − 1 periods of signal information already incorporated into the market price, making
the gains uncertain. However, as the number of periods increases, the effect each agent has
on equilibrium price by placing their optimal demand diminishes, so that demands in the
certain and uncertain case merge and information η is fully incorporated.
2.5 A notion of confidence
Now that we have investigated the informed investing environment with certain and uncertain
positions of movement, we can turn attention to how confidence plays a role in investment
decisions. In particular, we saw in the environments with and without certainty that as the
number of periods T increases price increased to the true value η of the asset. Furthermore
we saw that this convergence was slower in the case of positional uncertainty but hardly by
much; for T ≥ 40 the prices were barely distinguishable.
Now we introduce the notion of confidence and attempt to answer the same questions. In
particular, we would like to investigate in the presence of confidence over uncertain outcomes:
1. How does equilibrium price with confident agents compare to the case of no uncertainty?
2. How does equilibrium price with confident agents compare to the case of uncertainty
with neutral agents possessing uniform priors over positions t ≤ T?
3. As number of periods T grows large does price reflect the value η of the underlying
asset?
In order to begin to answer these questions we will need to introduce a notion of
confidence.
Definition 2.1. In a T period investment setting, an agent is neutral in terms of confidence





Given this definition, in the uncertain case previously analyzed all agents were neutral.
The concept of non-neutrality in terms of confidence takes the obvious definition.
Definition 2.2. In a T period investment setting, an agent is non-neutral in terms of
confidence if they are not confidence neutral. That is, if for some t1, t2 µt1 6= µt2.
There are infinitely many ways in which an agent can stray from confidence neutrality.
In order to narrow the scope of this definition, we will restrict attention to confidence over
the first period. An agent will be said to be overconfident if she overweighs the probability
of moving in the first period, and underconfident if she underweighs this probability.





T (T−1) for t ≥ 2 is overconfident if γ > 1 and underconfident if γ < 1.
In the scope of this definition it is the belief of moving first that determines confidence.
The probability of receiving the signal η in any other period is then spread uniformly across
all other periods.
2.5.1 Confidence: The mindful investor
With these definitions regarding the confidence of investors over their uncertain position
of movement we can define the equilibrium. Of course equilibrium behavior will depend
on beliefs of other agents as well. In particular we begin with agents who are non-neutral
(γ 6= 1) and take into account the non-neutrality of other agents. In this way we can think
of these agents as “mindful” of their departure from neutrality and that other agents make
the same departure. The market maker, unaware that investors behave anything other than
fully rational, will set price exactly as before.
Proposition 2.8. In a T ∈ N ∪ {∞} period investment setting, if informed agents do not
know their position but hold a common belief µ1 =
γ
T
, uniform µt =
T−γ
T (T−1) for t > 2 then
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there exists a linear equilibrium of the form pt = p0(1 − ϕ) + ϕpt−1 + λωt where p0 is the




T−1 [(T − 1)− (2ϕ− 1)(γ − 1)]
, λ =
√
ϕ(1− ϕ), and ϕ = 1− ϕ(1− ϕ
T )
T (1− ϕ)
As the parameter β makes clear γ has a predictable effect on demand for the asset.
Agents tend to demand more (less) if γ > 1 (γ < 1) as is easily seen in the denominator
into which γ enters negatively. When γ = 1 we return to the case of neutral uncertainty
described above. Having no way to know or reason to suspect non-neutrality the market
maker behaves as in the case of neutral agents. If the market maker were able to compensate
for non-neutrality the price would more closely resemble that of the neutral case.
The figures below depict the movements of price as number of periods increases comparing
the neutral case to the over/underconfident case when the true value of η is 1 and p0 = 1.
The figure on the left shows that in the case of overconfidence (γ = 2 here) the market price
is always higher than in the confidence neutral case. Investors underweight the possibility
that the price already contains information about the value η and thus demand more than
they otherwise would. In fact as the graph shows, for early periods the price actually exceeds
the value of η. With underconfidence we see even more caution than in the case of neutral
uncertainty with the underconfident agent even further believing that the price already
contains information about the value of the asset.
As the figures below demonstrate, comparing the results to initial market with no uncertainty
paints an even more dramatic picture. In the overconfident case with just a few periods the
price surpasses the geometric pricing schedule of no uncertainty. The underconfident case
takes appreciably longer to integrate information about value into the price.
From these figures it does seem like eventually given enough periods the price does
integrate the true value of η; it appears that after 150 periods of investment the value is
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Figure 2.3: Final market
price for neutral and mindful
overconfidence
Figure 2.4: Final market
price for neutral and mindful
underconfidence
almost completely incorporated. In fact as with the cases of no uncertainty and neutral
uncertainty we can say this unambiguously.
Proposition 2.9. For a T ∈ N ∪ {∞} period investment setting, if informed agents hold a
common belief Pr(t = 1) = γ
T
, uniform Pr(t) = T−γ





t=1 pt = p0 + η.
This proposition confirms that even if over(under)confident agents over(under)shoot the
price for small T , for a large enough T all information about the value η is incorporated into
the market price.
2.5.2 Confidence: The myopic investor
In the previous section we made the assumption that the non-neutral agent was “mindful”
in the sense of being aware other agents share the same confidence bias. But it is at least
as likely - if not more likely - that the agent is so confident that she believes she is the only
agent with the informational advantage that increases (decreases) her likelihood of moving
first. This would mean that in solving the maximization problem, it is assumed that other
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Figure 2.5: Final market
price for certain and mindful
overconfidence
Figure 2.6: Final market
price for certain and mindful
underconfidence
agents behave as if they were neutral investors, and the confident investor would dismiss the
possibility of others also biasing their belief of moving first.
Proposition 2.10. In a T ∈ N ∪ {∞} period investment setting, if informed agents do not





T (T−1) for t > 2 and believe other agents have
a uniform prior Pr(t) = 1
T
for all t ≤ T then there exists a linear equilibrium of the form
pt = p0(1 − ϕ) + ϕpt−1 + λωt where p0 is the price before information η enters the market










ϕ(1− ϕ), and ϕ = 1− ϕ(1− ϕ
T )
T (1− ϕ)
Again the market maker sets price as in the neutral case having no information about
the confidence bias of investors. As we have seen, even knowing the existence and magnitude
of a bias is insufficient because of they many ways investors can operationalize their bias,
mindfully and myopically among them.
In the following figures we see the comparison of naive confidence and the neutral and
certain cases with the true value of η = 1 and p0 = 0 as in all previous analyses. We
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see again that demand is increasing in confidence γ which appears positively in both the
β and δ terms. Clearly as γ → 1 this approaches our previous equilibrium of confidence
neutrality. The magnitude of this difference, however, is difficult to interpret from the first
order conditions.
As figures 2.11 and 2.12 show, we have the same pattern of the overconfident investor
Figure 2.7: Final market
price for neutral and myopic
overconfidence
Figure 2.8: Final market
price for neutral and myopic
underconfidence
(left) investing so much more than in the neutral case that in very few periods price exceeds
the true value of η = 1. Now, however, convergence of price to the true value of the asset
seems questionable. Even after 200 periods the price of the over(under)confident investor
over(under) estimates the value by about 3 percent; p200 = 1.032 (p200 = 0.971). Despite the
persistence in price distortion the bias introduces, we can in fact establish a limit result.
Proposition 2.11. In the above equilibrium for which T ∈ N ∪ {∞} and agents hold belief
Pr(t = 1) = γ
T
, uniform Pr(t) = T−γ
T (T−1) for T > 2, and believe other agents hold a uniform
prior Pr(t) = 1
T
for all t ≤ T , limT→∞ E[pt] = p0 + η and plimT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 pt = p0 + η.
While this limit result confirms that even in the case of myopic confidence we have that
the asset price reflects its true value this convergence is extremely slow. This is of course
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Figure 2.9: Final market
price for certain and myopic
overconfidence
Figure 2.10: Final market
price for certain and myopic
overconfidence
due to the weighting of µ1 that causes the agent to under/overestimate the probability that
price already contains information about the value η from other agents. But even more than
in the case of the mindfully confident investor, as more time periods/investors are added,
the fact that each investor does not account for others’ confidence γ prevents the bias from
being spread over more and more periods as efficiently.
Figure 2.11: Final market
price for all forms of
overconfidence
Figure 2.12: Final market
price for all forms of
overconfidence
The above figures show all of the cases together. As can be seen by the comparison,
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although mindful confidence suffers some pathology for small T , after a relatively short time
it converges to the certain and neutral cases. The cases of myopic confidence, however, seem
to take their time. While they reach η ± 3% in relatively short order, with increasing time
periods T this difference does not seem to relent. This is due to the slow convergence of
ϕ → 1. While all other prices depended on the convergence of ϕT → 0, the convergence of
this series depends on the convergence of ϕ. This is, of course, a direct result of agents not
considering the confidence biases of other agents.
2.6 Concluding remarks
In a investment setting with informed investors, liquidity traders, and a market maker seeking
to match the unknown value of an asset there are clear predictions in the case of certainty.
Agents who face no uncertainty - either about the value of the asset or the number of
investors who have acted before them - maximize profit in a linear equilibrium by halving
the remaining value, leading to a rapid geometric convergence of the price to the asset’s
value. A generalization of this model wherein agents do not know the period in which they
receive the informative signal, and as such do not know in which period they choose their
demand, demonstrates a similar pattern that is slightly blunted by the uncertainty of how
many investors had previously incorporated this profit relevant information into the price.
The introduction of confidence into this framework enriched the environment of uncertainty,
allowing agents to differ in how they responded to not knowing the period when they receive
the signal or how stale the information might be. Overconfident agents overweigh the
probability of being first, leading to more demand than is profitable even in the case of
certainty. This is reflected in a price that is higher than if the agents were neutral in terms
of confidence, and possibly even higher than the value of the asset. Underconfident investors,
conversely, tended to demand less of the asset than was profitable, leading to a price that
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lagged every other case and took longer to converge to the true value.
One operationalization of confidence - “mindful” confidence - led to a higher/lower
price than was otherwise profitable, and yet as the number of periods grew large the price
converged to the value of the asset rather quickly. This result is appealing in that confidence
biases of agents are not too disruptive to the information value of asset price given a suitably
large number of periods. And yet, while the concept of mindful confidence allowed for
agents’ beliefs to take into account that other agents share similar biases, the idea of being
concurrently biased about one’s own beliefs and mindful of others is in a sense contradictory.
An agent may be overconfident that they are particularly shrewd observers of the financial
news, picking up on value-relevant signals before others can catch on. But if they take into
account that others act in the same way is it true that they are more adept at interpreting
information? They may maintain an edge over some investors, but if they plan investment
strategies based on others taking the same factors in mind and undertaking the same line of
iterative induction, the belief that these investors are as na¨ıve as all other seems to break
down.
Out of this contradiction arose the notion of “myopic” confidence whereby investors
are confident that they move first and discount the possibility that other investors share
confidence biases. This concept conforms more to our idea of what it means to be too
confident. In the setting of myopic confidence we found an even more exaggerated departure
in demand behavior and price as a measure of value. Even though the price of the asset in
this case converges to the true value in the limit it does so extremely slowly. In fact given a
200 period time horizon we saw the asset price still failed to converge.
In each of these investment environments the asset value was perfectly known (granted,
by different investors at different times) and this value never changes. It may be of comfort
to the informational value of price that in all but the most extreme case of myopic confidence
price converges quickly to the true value. But of course in a more dynamic setting the value
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is ever changing and signals are constantly being disseminated. If any of the above models
were to be repeated every 5-10 periods the informational value at the limit would never have
an opportunity to realize, leading to a potentially dramatic departure between the price of
an asset and its value. Even if the effects of confidence did not accrue but canceled as a
result of value fluctuation this still leaves the market with an undesirable level of volatility
that reduces the appeal of investment and the ability of the market operate efficiently.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Conjecture a linear price equilibrium of the form pt = pt−1+λtωt
and consider the first agent’s optimization problem. The anticipated market price is p1 =
p0 + λ1ω1 so the agent solves
max
x1
x1E[v0 + η − p1|θ] = x1(η − E[λ1ω1]) = x1(η − λ1x1)








with Zt ∼ N(0, Vt). Then the agent in period t+ 1 solves
max
xt+1








which yields equilibrium xt+1 =
η−∑ti=1 λiωi
2λt+1




and 2λtxt = η −
∑t−1





η −∑t−1i=1 λiωi − λtωt
2λt+1
=
η −∑t−1i=1 λiωi − λtxt − λtzt
2λt+1
=





By the induction assumption λtxt =
1
2t
























so that xt+1 =
1
2t+1λt+1
η + Zt+1 where Zt+1 =
λt(Zt−zt)
2λt+1
∼ N(0, λ2t (Vt+Ω)
4λ2t+1




gives Zt+1 ∼ N(0, Vt+1). Then xt+1 = βt+1η + Zt+1 where βt+1 = 12t+1λt+1 Thus by
induction this holds for all t ≤ T .
Now consider the problem of the market maker. In each period the market maker sets
the price in order to match the value of the asset. That is pt = E[v0 + η|ωt, ht] where again
ωt = xt + zt is market demand, and ht is the historical series of market demand. Then in
period 1
































































Consider a general t > 1. The market maker again sets price to match the expected value
of the asset so that


























(v0 + η − pt−1)
∣∣∣∣ 12λt (v0 + η − pt−1) + zt, ht
]
+ pt−1










then by induction this is the variance of η for all t > 1. Then the above expectation becomes





































⇒ 8λ2t + 1 = 2













































and by induction Vt =
Ω
2
for all t > 1.
Since it has been shown that βt =
1
2tλt








2t−1 for t > 1 as desired.
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Lastly, pt = pt−1 + λtωt so inductively
pt = p0 +
t∑
i=1
λiωi = p0 +
t∑
i=1



























η + Z ′t
where Z ′t is a linear combination of independently normally distributed random variables
with mean zero so Z ′t ∼ N(0, V ′t )




maker sets price so that pt = E[vt|βtη + zt] = Vt−1βtVt−1β2t+Ω , where Vt−1 is the market maker’s
prior belief of the informative signal’s variance. Then
βtλt =
β2t Vt−1
β2t Vt−1 + Ω
= y
This yields β2t Vt−1 =
yΩ
1−y . When the market maker updates variance of the agent’s signal
given that liquidity noise zt ∼ N(0,Ω),
Vt =
β2t Vt−1Ω








yΩ + (1− y)Ω = yΩ
Since this was independent of the value Vt−1, variance will be Vt = yΩ for every period with
only the possible exception of V0 before variance can be updated from the prior belief.
Proof of Proposition 2. The previous proof shows that the optimal quantity for the agent
in period t is xt =
λt−1xt−1−λt−1zt−1
2λt






















λizi so the result holds for t = 2.






































































































and by induction the result holds for all t ≤ T .
As noted in proposition 1



















































































































































































For each T variance of XT (given that the zi are independent) is






























































































Let ε > 0. By Markov’s inequality,
Pr(|Xt − (p0 + η)| ≥ ε) ≤
E
[(






















































































t=1 pt = p0 + η.
Note that λ21 =
σ2
4Ω





→ 0 ⇐⇒ Ω
8T 2
→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that the agent solves the problem maxx x · (η − λt+1x −
(1− γ)λtE[y]). This yields the optimal response to y of
Conjecture a linear price equilibrium of the form pt = p0(1− ϕ) + ϕpt−1 + λωt for t > 1
where p0 is the price before information η entered the market. The agent seeks to maximize
xE[vt − pt] = xE[v0 + η − p0(1− ϕ)− ϕpt−1 − λωt]
= x (E[v0] + η − p0(1− ϕ)− ϕE[pt−1]− λx)
Which is maximized for x = ϕp0+η−ϕE[pt−1]
2λ
since p0 = E[v0]. If the agent moves in the first
period price is p0 while second period price is p1 = p0 + λω1. With prior Pr(F ) = γi the
price pt−1 = γip0 + (1− γi)p1 = p0 + (1− γi)λω1. For a second period mover, E[ω1] = E[x1],
demand can be written as
x =
η + ϕ(p0 − pt−1)
2λ
=
























λ[4− ϕ2γi(1− γi)] and E[βj(γi)] =
2− ϕγi
λ[4− ϕ2γi(1− γi)]
The market maker sets price so that pt = E[vt|ωt, ht] so
pt = E[vt|ωt, ht] = E[v0 + η|ωt, ht] = p0 + E[η|ωt, ht] = p0 + 1
β
E[βη|βη + zt, ht]
Recall that zt ∼ N(0,Ω) and the prior belief on the value is η ∼ N(pt−1 − p0, V ). Then
βη ∼ N(β(pt−1 − p0), β2V ) and
pt = p0 +
Ωβ(pt−1 − p0) + β2V ωt
β(Ω + β2V )
= p0 +









If the market maker cannot distinguish between agent types price must be taken assuming
a weighted average βt = µβ(γi) + (1−µ)β(γ2). Moreover if the market is not able to update
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Moreover, if the market maker believes both investors are equally likely to move first, then
µ = 1
2
and this reduces to β = 2
λ(4+ϕ)
. Given that βλ = 1 − ϕ = β2V
Ω+β2V
, this solves to
β2 = (1−ϕ)Ω
V ϕ














(1− ϕ) + (1− εT ) = (1− ϕ)Ω






ϕ(1−ϕ). From the fact that βλ = 2
4+ϕ
= 1−ϕ, ϕ2 + 3ϕ− 2 = 0




≈ 0.562 and λ ≈ 0.329
Proof of Proposition 5. Conjecture a linear price equilibrium of the form pt = p0(1 −
ϕ) + ϕpt−1 + λωt where p0 is the price before information η entered the market. The agent
seeks to maximize
xE[vt − pt] = xE[v0 + η − p0(1− ϕ)− ϕpt−1 − λωt]
= x (E[v0] + η − p0(1− ϕ)− ϕpt−1 − λx)
Which is maximized for x = ϕp0+η−ϕpt−1
2λ
since p0 = E[v0]. If the agent moves in the second
period price is p1 = p0 + λω1. If the agent moves in the third period then price is p2 =
p0 + λω2 + ϕλω1. Inductively if the agent moves in period t then t − 1 agents move before




If there are T periods and each agent has the belief µt that they are moving in period t
and since since ωt = xt + zt and zt are independently distributed with zero mean, ωt = xt
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is the expectation for each period. Moreover since the agent has no additional information

















where the outer summation starts from t = 2 because when t = 1 the agent moves in the
first period and there is no previous demand. Imposing agents’ symmetry and the uniform
belief over their period of movement, xi = x for all i and µt =
1
T























































(2− ϕ)− ϕ(1−ϕT )
T (1−ϕ)
]
The market maker sets price such that pt = E[vt|ωt]. Then
pt = E[vt|ωt] = E[v0 + η|xt + zt] = p0 + E[η|βη + zt] = p0 + 1
β
E[βη|βη + zt]
Recall that zt ∼ N(0,Ω) and the prior belief on the value is η ∼ N(pt−1 − p0, V ). Then
βη ∼ N(β(pt−1 − p0), β2V ) and
pt = p0 +
Ωβ(pt−1 − p0) + β2V ωt
β(Ω + β2V )
= p0 +










For notational convenience let εT =
ϕ(1−ϕT )





(2− ϕ)− εT =
β2V
Ω + β2V
β2V [(2− ϕ)− εT ] = (1− ϕ)(Ω + β2V )
β2 =
(1− ϕ)Ω
V (1− εT )
Given that ϕ = Ω
Ω+β2V







1− εT + (1− ϕ)
ϕ(2− ϕ− εT ) = 1− εT
(1− ϕ)2 = εT (1− ϕ)
ϕ = 1− εT


















V (1− εT ) = β
2 =
(1− ϕ)Ω
(1− ϕ)Ω(1− εT ) =
1
ϕ









Proof of Proposition 6. From the above the price can be expanded as
pt = (1− ϕ)p0 + λωt + ϕpt−1 = (1− ϕ)p0 + ϕp0 +
t∑
i=1





































and so E[pt] = p0 + (1− ϕT )η
Lemma 2.2. If x, ϕ ∈ (0, 1) and limt→∞ xt = limt→∞ ϕt = p for some p ∈ (0, 1), then
limt→∞ t(1− ϕ)2 = limt→∞ t(1− x)2 if such a limit exists.
Proof. Let ε > 0 small enough so 0 < p − ε < p + ε < 1 and choose T ∈ N such that
t ≥ T implies both p − ε < xt < p + ε and p − ε < ϕt < p + ε. Then (p − ε)1/t < x <
(p+ ε)1/t, (p− ε)1/t < ϕ < (p+ ε)1/t, and moreover |ϕ− x| < |(p+ ε)1/t − (p− ε)1/t|. Then
|t(1− ϕ)2 − t(1− x)2| = t|ϕ2 − x2 − 2(ϕ− x)| = t|(ϕ− x)((ϕ+ x)− 2)|
< 4t|ϕ− x| < 4t|(p+ ε)1/t − (p− ε)1/t|






















Then using L’Hoˆpital’s Rule
|t(1− ϕ)2 − t(1− x)2| < lim
t→∞
4t|(p+ ε)1/t − (p− ε)1/t| = lim
t→∞




















since both (p−ε)1/t and (p+ε)1/t converge to 1. For any δ > 0 letting ε < p(exp{δ/4}−1)
exp{δ/4}+1 yields
the result that |t(1−ϕ)2− t(1− x)2| < δ and thus limt→∞ t(1−ϕ)2 = limt→∞ t(1− x)2.
Lemma 2.3. In equilibrium, ϕ implicitly defined by 1− ϕ = ϕ(1−ϕT )
T (1−ϕ) must converge to 1.
Proof. In equilibrium ϕ = Ω
Ω+β2V
so ϕ ∈ (0, 1). If limT→∞ ϕ = p ∈ [0, 1) then ϕT → 0 and
1− ϕ = ϕ(1−ϕT )
T (1−ϕ) → 0 so ϕ→ 1. Thus it must be that ϕ→ 1.
Corollary 2.2. In equilibrium, εT =
ϕ(1−ϕ)
T (1−ϕ) must converge to 0.
Lemma 2.4. For the above where 1− ϕ = ϕ(1−ϕT )
T (1−ϕ) , limT→∞ ϕ
T = 0.
Proof. Since ϕ ∈ (0, 1), limT→∞ ϕT ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose the series converges to some number
inside the interval so limT→∞ ϕT = p ∈ (0, 1). By definition (1− ϕ) = ϕ(1−ϕT )T (1−ϕ) so that
lim
T→∞
T (1− ϕ)2 = lim
T→∞
ϕ(1− ϕT ) = 1− p
Consider x = p1/T . Clearly xT converges to p and since p ∈ (0, 1) limT→∞ x = 1. Then by
the above lemma since the limit exists limT→∞ T (1− x)2 = 1− p. However,
lim
T→∞
T (1− x)2 = lim
T→∞














2 ln(p)(p2/T − p1/T ) = 0
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since both p1/T → 1 and p2/T → 1. This contradiction shows that p cannot be interior so
that limT→∞ ϕT ∈ {0, 1}.
Suppose then that limT→∞ ϕT = 1. Recall that given the definition of εT ,
lim
T→∞
(1− ϕ) = lim
T→∞
ϕ(1− ϕT )
T (1− ϕ) = limT→∞
ϕ′(T )− ϕT+1[ln(ϕ) + (T + 1)ϕ′(T )/ϕ]
(1− ϕ)− Tϕ′(T )
= lim
T→∞
ϕ′(T )− ϕT+1 ln(ϕ)− (T + 1)ϕ′(T )ϕT
(1− ϕ)− Tϕ′(T )
=
limT→∞[ϕ′(T )(1− ϕT − TϕT )− ϕT+1 ln(ϕ)]
limT→∞[(1− ϕ)− Tϕ′(T )]
= lim
T→∞
ϕ′(T )(1− ϕT − TϕT )
−Tϕ′(T ) = 1
since ϕT → 1, ϕ → 1. Thus 1 − ϕ → 1 so ϕ → 0. Then it must be that ϕ converges to
something less than 1, but if this is so then ϕ(1−ϕ
T )
T (1−ϕ) → 0 which contradicts that limT→∞ ϕ < 1.
The only remaining possibility is that limT→∞ ϕT = 0.





p0 + (1− ϕT )η = p0 + η.





















= p0 + η − ϕ(1− ϕ
T )









For each T variance of XT (given that the zi are independent) is












































1− (ϕ2)t) = ϕ(1− ϕ)Ω
T (1 + ϕ)
− ϕ(1− ϕ)Ω








T (1 + ϕ)
− ϕ(1− ϕ)Ω







T (1 + ϕ)
− ϕ
3(1− ϕ2T )Ω
T 2(1 + ϕ)2
=
ϕ(1− ϕ)Ω




T (1 + ϕ)
)(
(1 + ϕT )
T (1 + ϕ)
)
ϕ3Ω
Let ε > 0. By Markov’s inequality,
Pr(|Xt − (p0 + η)| ≥ ε) ≤
E
[(





























































as T →∞ since ϕ→ 1 by Lemma 3, ϕT → 0 by Lemma 4, and 0 ≤ ϕ(1−ϕT )Ω
T (1+ϕ)
≤ ϕ(1−ϕT )Ω
T (1−ϕ) → 0
by Lemma 3 which implies ϕ(1−ϕ
T )Ω
T (1+ϕ)
→ 0. Therefore plimT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 pt = p0 + η.
Proof of Proposition 8. Since the market maker is not aware of the confidence bias it
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still sets λ =
√
ϕ(1− ϕ) and ϕ = 1− ϕ(1−ϕT )
T (1−ϕ) . From the proof of Proposition 5 we was that














Now with a weight γ put on being a first mover, µ1 =
γ
T
and all other beliefs µt =
T−γ
T (T−1) ,

















− T − γ











− T − γ









− T − γ








Imposing symmetry of x = xi demand becomes
2x(1− ϕ) = (1− ϕ)η
λ











T−1 [(T − 1)− (2ϕ− 1)(γ − 1)]
Proof of Proposition 9. From the proof of Proposition 6 we determined that







So with demand x = (1−ϕ)ηλ
t−1 [(t−1)−(2ϕ−1)(γ−1)]
expected price in time t is
E[pt] = p0 +
(1− ϕ)η
1


















limt→∞ 1t−1 [(t− 1)− (2ϕ− 1)(γ − 1)]
= p0 + η
since ϕ→ 1, and ϕt → 0. Thus limt→∞ E[pt] = p0 + η.
Probability limit result achieved by applying Markov’s law as in Proposition 7.




− T − γ








If the agent believes all others act as though they have a uniform distribution over position




















2(T − γ)(1− ϕ)












Proof of Proposition 11. From the proof of Proposition 6 we determined that






Given that demand is x = (1−ϕ)η
λ
+ (γ−1)(2ϕ−1)η
2λ(t−1) from Proposition 10, the expected price in
time t becomes











E[pt] = p0 + η + 0





→ 0. Thus limt→∞ E[pt] = p0 + η.
Probability limit result achieved by applying Markov’s law as in Proposition 7.
73
Chapter 3
Social learning with limited histories
Abstract: I adapt the standard observational learning environment and introduce
a limited history of observation. When agents can only observe the action of the
previous agent, complete learning still occurs but with a loss of welfare. When a
limited history is coupled with uncertainty over position in the queue of actors,
welfare further drops - increasing in uncertainty - but complete learning still
occurs in the limit. These results are illustrated with a canonical linear model




The social learning literature has highlighted the tension between the presence of sufficient
information for full learning of the true state, and the rationality of agents ignoring their
private information and joining a herd, leading to incomplete learning with positive probability.
This literature was sparked by the work of Banerjee (1992) [2] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and, Welch (1992) [3], who introduce a framework of identical agents receiving independent
and identically distributed signals. The critical insight is that as a result of observing the
full history of previous actions, agents may find it rational to ignore their private signal and
infer the state of the world from the actions of previous decision makers. Since agents are
identical this implies all future agents face the same decision, and an “information cascade”
occurs whereby all agents ignore their private information.
There have been many extensions to this framework that allow for heterogeneous agent
types, limited observable histories, or more generally the formation of networks of viewable
histories, either exogenously formed or formed endogenously subject to a cost. However,
little attention has been given to the social learning problem in which agents do not have
full information about their position in the chain of decision makers.
The classic social learning example of deciding whether to eat at a restaurant or stay
home suffices in demonstrating how strong are the assumptions of the social learning model.
The story goes that a new restaurant opens in town and patrons must decide whether to
visit the new eatery or stay home by using their private signal and observing the choices of
others. As it goes, the agents later in line for dinner are able to infer the signals of earlier
agents through their actions, with such inference either buttressing or altogether overriding
their own private signal. But of course this depends on a full observation of the history of
actions.
This assumption is actually a composite of two assumptions. The first is that every
75
previous action is observed. This assumption may be reasonable for early diners, but the
idea of later diners spending all evening staking out the restaurant in order to make their
decision is implausible. Even if such observation were possible indirectly, through word of
mouth or consolidated review sources (i.e. Yelp or Google), observations are sure to get lost
as the restaurant remains open over a longer period of time. And as time goes on, not only do
observations get lost, but the number of choices get lost, highlighting the second assumption
in social learning that agents know their position. It may be possible on opening night for a
diner to know if they are among the first hundred patrons, but after the restaurant has been
open a year diners might not even know if they are among the first hundred thousand!
It is the goal of this paper to investigate a social learning environment in which agents
have only a limited history of observable actions. While unbounded signals ensure complete
learning in the case of a fully observable history, a limited history leads to faster learning (in
terms of convergence of decision thresholds), but a lower expected utility. Complete learning
is also shown in the case of positional uncertainty but at the cost of a further decline in
expected utility.
3.2 Related literature
The model presented here is most similar to the framework of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and, Welch (1992) [3] (henceforth BHW). BHW present a framework in which agents observe
conditionally independent signals, as well as the actions of all previous agents. They show
that rational agents enter into a herd, ignoring their private information when deciding on
the choice of action, with positive probability.
The work of Banerjee (1992) [2] also helped spark the herding literature. This model
differs in that agents face a continuum of choices, with only one (unknown) correct choice
for the state of the world. In addition, only some agents receive an informative signal, and
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it is only known to the agent whether or not she has a signal. As in BHW, Banerjee shows
that agents rationally converge to a herd, even if they have an informative signal. This
result is again driven by the fact that signals are not perfectly informative, so it may be
more reasonable to discard private information by inferring the state of the world from the
actions of others.
Smith and Sørensen (2000) [7] investigate social learning with heterogeneous agents.
They discuss the concept of full learning, where the probability of taking the right action
tends to 1 as the number of agents increases. They identify the importance of unbounded
signals: if signals can be arbitrarily precise, there is always a probability of a strong signal
overturning a herd. This differs from BHW in that signal precision is heterogeneous, so even
in the presence of a strong herd a well-informed agent can change public opinion.
The notion of endogenous timing in social learning was explored by Gul and Lundholm
(1995) [5]. They investigate a setting in which agents receive payoff-relevant signals, and
attempt to guess the sum of these signals. Agents choose when to make their prediction,
with an associated cost to waiting. They show that since agents with higher signals perceive
a higher opportunity cost to waiting, they will act sooner. Given that higher signals convey
more information, endogenizing the timing actually results in the efficient ordering of agents’
actions.
Limited observable histories has been investigated through the idea of a “network” which
describes the set of actions a given agent can observe. Acemoglu et al. (2011) [1] identify
the unboundedness of networks as the condition that guarantees full learning. That is, as
long as the size of a given agent’s network is not bounded by some integer, convergence to
the correct action occurs at the limit, so there is full learning. Song (2014) [8] arrives at a
similar finding in a setting where networks are formed endogenously subject to a cost.
An early theoretical work addressing social learning with limited histories is C¸elen, B.
and Kariv, S. (2004) [4], wherein agents decide between actions sequentially with the aid
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of a private signal and observation of the previous action. This model, however, featured a
payoff as the sum of signals, a departure from the traditional framework of a correct action
for each state. In fact in their model the state itself changes as the sum of signals oscillates
between negative and positive. The present work attempts to apply the traditional social
learning framework to a setting of limited observation, showing that complete learning still
holds under the usual assumptions.
Perhaps the most closely related work is Monzo´n and Rapp (2014). In this model agents
receive private signals but their observational history is limited to a random sampling of
previous decision makers. They show that social learning persists under positional uncertainty,
provided that action samples satisfy a stationarity assumption whereby they cannot be from
the too distant past. This work also demonstrates the welfare loss of positional uncertainty.
The focus of this work is a stationarity assumption, whereas at present we focus on the
role of beliefs over position and how changes in these beliefs affects learning and welfare in
equilibrium.
3.3 Model
Suppose N agents decide sequentially between one of two actions, a ∈ A = {0, 1} in an
exogenously determined order. There are two states of the world, Ω = {l, h}, and all agents
agree that it is preferable to take action a = 1 in state h and a = 0 in state l. As such, agents
share common risk-neutral vN-M utilities un(1, h) = un(0, l) = 1 and un(0, h) = un(1, l) = 0.




Before deciding on an action each agent receives a private signal θ ∈ [−1, 1] about the state
of the world. The signal θ is distributed according to F = {Fω(θ)}ω∈Ω, and conditional on
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the state ω signals are drawn independently. We will assume the signal distributions are
continuous and admit density functions.
Assumption 3.1 (C1). Signal distributions Fl and Fh are continuously differentiable. Denote
their densities as fl and fh, respectively.
We will require the usual (strict) monotone likelihood ratio property suggesting it is more
likely to receive high values of signal θ in state h and low values in state l.
Assumption 3.2 (MLRP). The distribution functions fl and fh satisfy the (strict) monotone
likelihood ratio property in the sense that fh(θ)
fl(θ)
is strictly increasing in θ.
We will assume that Fh(θ) and Fl(θ) are mutually absolutely continuous on the interval
[−1, 1]. While this rules out any signal being perfectly informative of the state, we will
assume that signals can come pretty close in the sense of an unbounded likelihood ratio.
Assumption 3.3 (Unbounded signal strength). The informativeness of signal θ is










And finally, to avoid diverting the analysis from the implications of the learning environment
through unnecessary complication, we will assume that the state dependent distributions are
mutually symmetric about zero, though the results hold in the absence of this assumption.
Assumption 3.4 (Mutual Symmetry). Signal distributions Fl and Fh are mutually symmetric
in the sense that for all θ ∈ supp(F ), fl(θ) = fh(−θ).
3.3.2 Observable histories
In addition to receiving the conditionally independent private signal θ, agents observe a
history Hn ⊆ {a1, a2, . . . , an−1} of actions of preceding agents. Action profiles of the n − 1
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agents who have moved by the start of period n take realizations An−1 ∈ An−1. Letting
Hn = An−1 collapses the problem to the traditional sequential learning framework a la
Smith and Sørensen. While our focus is social learning settings with limited observable
histories, we will be interested in the traditional framework of fully observable histories as a
baseline for comparison.
3.3.3 Equilibrium
The preliminaries above define a social learning game.
Definition 3.1. Let Γ(Hn) = {F, un, an, Hn}Nn=1 denote a social learning game satisfying
assumptions (A1)-(A4) with history Hn ⊂ An−1.
In equilibrium each agent chooses an ∈ A to maximize expected utility E[u(an, ω)|θn, Hn].
Given the assumption of monotonicity on the likelihood ratio, a natural notion of equilibrium
is that of a threshold θˆ which if exceeded will induce an agent to take action an = 1.
Definition 3.2. Agent n follows a threshold strategy if
an =

1 if θn ≥ θˆn
0 if θn < θˆn
for some θˆn ∈ supp(F ).
Since the probability distribution has no masses, the tie breaking rule for θn = θˆn will
play no role in the analysis. Under the above assumptions, an equilibrium in which players
utilize threshold strategies always exists.







Figure 3.1: Final market price for certain and uncertain position
The existence of a threshold strategy equilibrium follows easily from the monotone
likelihood ratio property. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
3.3.4 Social learning
Finally, we will examine the information aggregation properties of any equilibrium. In
particular it will be of interest whether given a large enough game of social learning, agents
tend to take the right action. For this we introduce a natural definition of learning.
Definition 3.3. For a social learning game Γ(Hn), we will say that complete learning occurs
if limn→∞ Pr(an = 1|h) = 1 and limn→∞ Pr(an = 0|l) = 1.
3.4 The linear case
To fix ideas consider the distribution functions Fh(θ) =
1
4
(1 + θ)2 and Fl(θ) = 1− 14(1− θ)2
which admit linear densities fh(θ) =
1
2




The probability densities depicted above demonstrate the linear manner in which higher
signals becoming more likely than low signals in state ω = h. It can easily be verified that
the densities fl and fh satisfy assumptions (A1)-(A4).
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3.4.1 Fully observable history
Consider first the case where the complete history of actions taken by preceding agents is
observable (e.g. Hn = An−1). The first agent has no predecessor and thus observes the
history A0 = ∅. Given that a1 = 1 is preferred in state ω = h and a1 = 0 is preferred in
state ω = l, with utilities un the agent will choose a1 = 1 if and only if
Pr(h|θ1) ≥ Pr(l|θ1) ⇐⇒ Pr(θ1|h) Pr(h) ≥ Pr(θ1|l) Pr(l) ⇐⇒ fh(θ1) ≥ fl(θ1)








(1 + θ) ≥ 1
2
(1− θ)
which reduces to θ1 ≥ 0 so that θˆ1 = 0.
Having observed a1, the second agent will choose a2 = 1 if and only if
Pr(h|θ2, a1) ≥ Pr(l|θ2, a1) ⇐⇒ Pr(θ2, a1|h) ≥ Pr(θ2, a1|l)
The threshold θˆ2 will depend on a1, with Pr(a1 = 1|ω) = Pr(θ ≥ θˆ1|ω) = 1 − Fω(θ1) and
Pr(a1 = 0|ω) = Fω(θˆ1). If a1 = 1, then since θˆ1 = 0 agent 2 will choose a2 = 1 if
Pr(θ2, θ1 > 0|h) Pr(h) ≥ Pr(θ2, θ1 > 0|l) Pr(l)
⇐⇒ fh(θ2)(1− Fh(0)) Pr(h) ≥ fl(θ2)(1− Fl(0)) Pr(l)
⇐⇒ 1
2











where the second inequality comes from the conditional independence of the signal. The
threshold then reduces to θ2 ≥ −12 . A similar calculation shows that agent 2 chooses the
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if a1 = 1
1
2
if a1 = 0
The equilibrium threshold for an arbitrary agent n is solved in much the same way, taking
into account the entire history An−1 leading up to the decision to act. As above, agent n
will choose an = 1 if and only if
fh(θn) Pr(An−1|h) Pr(h) ≥ fl(θn) Pr(An−1|l) Pr(l)






While each threshold strategy θˆn depends on the entire history of actions An−1, in comparing
thresholds θˆn and θˆn−1, the only informational asymmetry between agents n and (n − 1) is
in the realization of θn−1, known only to (n− 1). Since the threshold θˆn−1 already contains
information about the full history An−2 up to the decision an−1, this suggests the possibility
of a direct relationship between adjacent thresholds, enabling a recursive formulation of θˆn.
Indeed this is the case.
Proposition 3.2. For the social learning game with fully observable histories Γ(An−1) and
canonical signal structure defined by Fh(θ) =
1
4
(1 + θ)2 and Fl(θ) = 1− 14(1− θ)2, θˆ1 = 0 and
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if an−1 = 1
1
2−θˆn−1 if an−1 = 0
Since the canonical case satisfies all of the traditional social learning assumptions that
guarantee complete learning (e.g. MLRP, unbounded signals), it should be no surprise that
the thresholds θˆn converge and that complete learning is indeed achieved with a linear signal
structure. Given the form of the decision thresholds, the conditional expectation is easily
calculated as
E[θˆn|θˆn−1, h]− θˆn−1 = (θˆn−1 + 1)
2(θˆn−1 − 1)
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
and
E[θˆn|θˆn−1, l]− θˆn−1 = (θˆn−1 + 1)(θˆn−1 − 1)
2
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
enabling application of the Martingale Convergence Theorem to yield the result.
Proposition 3.3. For the social learning game with fully observable histories Γ(An−1) and
the canonical signal structure, state dependent thresholds θˆn(ω) converge with limn→∞ θˆn(l) =
1, limn→∞ θˆn(h) = −1, and complete learning occurs.
3.4.2 Limited histories
Suppose now that instead of observing the entire history of preceding agents An−1, histories
are limited in that each agent can only observe the predecessor’s action. The viewable history
is then Hn = an−1. The first two movers will behave the same way because they observe
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the histories A0 = ∅ and A1 = a1, respectively, exactly as before. Then θˆ1 = 0; θˆ2 = −12 if
a1 = 1 and θˆ2 =
1
2
if a1 = 0. Now, however, Hn ( An−1 for n ≥ 2 so agents will have less
information with which to decide on an action an. With observable histories Hn = an−1, the






Given that for each n there are only two possible histories Hn (with the exception of n = 1),
we can reduce the decision of agent n to two thresholds
θˆn =

θ¯n if an−1 = 1
¯
θn if an−1 = 0
In the case of n = 2, θ¯2 = −12 and ¯θ2 =
1
2
. Notice that θ¯n +
¯
θn = 0 for n = 2. In fact this
will be true for all n. Given the symmetry of the payoff function in states ω = {l, h} this
result makes sense.
The departure from the case of fully observable histories begins with n = 3. Now agent
n observes history Hn = an−1 but does not observe the action an−2. But the probability of
an−1 for a given state will depend on action an−2, which itself will depend on an−3 and so





Given that the updated probability of a state depends on n−2 unobservable previous actions







An−2∈An−2 Pr(an−1|An−2, l) Pr(An−2|l) Pr(l)∑
An−2∈An−2 Pr(an−1|An−2, h) Pr(An−2|h) Pr(h)
In the case of fully observable histories it was possible to solve for thresholds θˆn recursively
because both agents n and (n − 1) condition on An−2. But now agent (n − 1) conditions
action an−2 which is unobservable to agent n. Notice, however, that the thresholds θ¯n−1 and
¯





An−3∈An−3 Pr(an−2|An−3, l) Pr(An−3|l) Pr(l)∑
An−3∈An−3 Pr(an−2|An−3, h) Pr(An−3|h) Pr(h)
for θˆn−1 = θ¯n−1 or θˆn−1 =
¯
θn−1 corresponding to an−2 = 1 or an−2 = 0, respectively. Since
history An−3 is unknown in both period n and (n − 1), this relationship enables player n
to condition threshold θˆn on only the two possible outcomes of an−2, greatly simplifying the
problem and giving the following result.
Proposition 3.4. For the social learning game with limited observable histories Γ(an−1)











θ2n−1) if an−1 = 0
As alluded to above and as thresholds θˆn clearly show, the symmetric signal structure
implies that the thresholds are also symmetric about zero for every n.
Corollary 3.1. For the social learning game with limited observable histories Γ(an−1) and




The evolution of thresholds θ¯n and
¯
θn is pictured below. As the figure shows, the bounds
θ¯n and
¯
θn diverge very quickly. This represents a higher standard of proof from signal θn in
order deviate from previous action an−1.
Figure 3.2: Decision thresholds under limited histories of observation
The thresholds partition the signal space into three regions. When θn >
¯
θn, the agent
will follow their signal and play an = 1 independent of previous action an−1, believing the
state ω = h to be more likely. When θn < θ¯n the agent will believe ω = l is more likely
and play an = 0. When θn ∈ (θ¯n,
¯
θn), the threshold for following the private signal is not
surpassed and the agent will always follow the previous action an−1.
The figure depicting thresholds in the case of limited observable history suggests convergence
to the limits of the distribution, so that as the periods advance the signal strength required
to deviate from imitation of the predecessor increases. This would imply complete learning
even in the case of limited histories, which the following result confirms.
Proposition 3.5. For the social learning game with limited observable histories Γ(an−1) and
the canonical signal structure, thresholds θ¯n if an−1 = 1 and
¯
θn if an−1 = 0 converge with
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limn→∞ θ¯n = −1, limn→∞
¯
θn = 1, and complete learning occurs.
With fully observable histories, the threshold θˆn was a recursive function of the previous
agent’s threshold, the function depending on the previous action an−1. Now, however, the
threshold is solely determined by an−1, and as such sequences θ¯n and
¯
θn take a predictable
pattern. In fact as a result of this predictability of θ¯n and
¯
θn, it is possible that the martingale
θˆn derived from fully history game Γ(An−1) does not converge as quickly as the thresholds
in limited history game Γ(an−1). In fact, as the following figure shows, on average this is the
case.
Figure 3.3: Maximum
threshold in state h
Figure 3.4: Expected
threshold in state h
The panel on the left shows the maximal threshold values in the cases of full and limited
history. In other words, these show the progression of the thresholds θn if ai = 1 for all i ≤ n.
It is clear that with a history of only action ai = 1 the threshold in the full information case
converges more quickly than in the case of limited history. The right panel, however, shows
that on average the threshold with limited history converges more quickly. In a sense, this
reflects that with a limited history of observation, thresholds depend only on the previous
action and are allowed to grow without respect to the full history. This fast growth is then
reinforced by observing an−1 = 1, given the strict threshold.
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This interplay between history independence and a growing threshold suggests an increased
possibility of error with limited observable histories. Comparing expected utilities highlights
the welfare consequences of this error.
Figure 3.5: Expected utility in for full and limited histories of observation
Figure 3.5 shows E[u(θ)|Hn = An−1] and E[u(θ)|Hn = an−1], the expected utilities with
full and limited histories. It shows, as we would expect, that on average utility is higher with
full information than under a limited history of observation. Even though the thresholds
converge faster on average with a limited history, suggesting faster learning, in fact this
reflects the loss of information as a result of limited observations.
This is again a depiction of the progression of expected thresholds θn, but the shaded
region of figure 3.6 shows where E[θn|Hn = An−1] > θ > E[θn|Hn = an−1]. This is where the
realization of signal θ falls between the thresholds in the full history case and the limited
history case. For signals in this region, agent n would follow their signal with a full history,
choosing an = 1 irrespective of the previous action, but would ignore the signal with a
limited history, choosing an = an−1 even if an−1 = 0. This increased possibility of error and
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Figure 3.6: Expected information loss from limited observation
propensity to discard information drives down expected utility under limited observational
history.
3.4.3 Positional uncertainty
Now suppose that in addition to observing only the action of the preceding agent, each agent
does not know their position. Instead agents hold beliefs µn over their positions, where µni is
the probability agent n places on moving in position i. Since the first mover easily deduces
being first by the absence of any preceding action, we introduce an agent in position 0 that
chooses as the first agent in the case of no positional uncertainty: a0 = 1 if and only if
θ0 ≥ 0.




N−1 for i 6= n, so that the agent in
position n has a belief γ ∈ [0, 1] of their true position and spreads the additional probability
1− γ uniformly across all other N − 1 positions. Then if agent n observes an−1 the decision
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i (Pr(ai−1|l) + Pr(ai−1|h))
The assumed form of our probabilities µn yield the following result.
Proposition 3.6. For the social learning game with limited observable histories Γ(at−1),
positional uncertainty µn, and the canonical signal structure, a threshold equilibrium can be
defined recursively as
θ¯1 =
N(γ − 2) + 1









N(3γ − 2)− 1





















Pr(an−1 = 0|l) +
¯
θ1 − 3(Nγ − 1)
2(N − 1)
As the thresholds make clear, the action dependent signals θ¯n and
¯
θn exhibit the same
91
symmetry about zero as in the case without positional uncertainty.
Corollary 3.2. For the social learning game with limited observable histories Γ(at−1), positional
uncertainty µn, and the canonical signal structure, θ¯n +
¯
θn = 0.
The figure below shows the evolution of thresholds which display the downward trend
that we have come to expect, suggestive of convergence to a limit.
Figure 3.7: Thresholds under posional uncertainty for various N
Now, however, each agent n holds the belief γ < 1 that they act in the position n that
they indeed do. This lack of certainty over position could translate into a lack of certainty
over the true state of the world, leading to a limit θ¯ > −1 or θ¯ < 1. Fortunately, it turns
out that if such a limit exists, this limit must be θ¯ = −1 or θ¯ = 1. While the speed of this
convergence will depend on belief parameter γ, complete learning occurs in the limit for all
beliefs.
Proposition 3.7. For the social learning game with limited observable histories Γ(at−1),




1 if such limits exist. Moreover, if these limits exist then complete learning occurs.
Notice also that the positional probability beliefs depend on N , and thus so do the
thresholds. As the figure above shows, the larger is the number of agents N , the faster
is the convergence of the threshold to its limit. As the number of agents increases, the
belief of moving in any position other than n becomes diluted. This applies particularly to
early positions where the predecessor faced a relatively low threshold, thereby inducing the
successor to require a higher standard of proof. As this probability decreases, each agent
relies more strongly on the true prior action an−1, thus leading to faster convergence of the
threshold.
Since the object of interest will be the evolution of learning as the number of agents
observing histories increases, we will focus on thresholds for large N , which take a convenient
form.
Proposition 3.8. For the social learning game with limited observable histories Γ(at−1),


























(1 + θ¯n−1)2 leads to a lower (higher) value of threshold θ¯n(
¯
θn) for every n. This leads
to a faster convergence to the limit, a rate which increases as belief γ decreases.
The above graph shows this relationship between γ and the rate of convergence, and in
fact at the extreme of γ → 0 the threshold converges immediately to θ¯n = −1 for all n.
Immediate convergence is the result of total positional uncertainty, whereby it makes more
sense to each agent to follow the action of the previous agent because they have no concept
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Figure 3.8: Thresholds under posional uncertainty for large N and various γ
of their own signal’s informational value.
As in the case of limited history we can compare expected utility to get a more complete
story of the welfare implications of this convergence. We would expect that the increased
rate of convergence to lead to a further loss of welfare, increasing the region where agents
ignore their information.
As expected, the figure above shows this exact result. The panel on the left shows a lower
expected utility under positional uncertainty characterized by γ = 0.75, while the right panel
shows an even further loss of utility for γ = 0.5. In fact expected utility in the case of limited
history can be shown to take an explicit form.
Proposition 3.9. Under positional uncertainty
E[u(θ)|Hn = an−1, µn] = 1
2γ
(1 + θ¯2n) +
1− γ
2γ
(θ¯2n + 2θ¯n − 1)
Comparative analysis on the parameter γ confirms the result that expected utility under
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Figure 3.9: Relationship between expected utility and gamma in state h
positional uncertainty E[u(θ)|Hn = an−1, µn] indeed decreases as uncertainty γ increases.
3.5 The general case
While much of the above used the canonical signal structure Fh(θ) =
1
4
(1 + θ2) and Fl(θ) =
1 − 1
4
(1 − θ2), many of the results hold for more general signal structures that satisfy the
assumptions (A1)-(A4). Of course, the result of complete learning should be no surprise,
as it has been the focus of much theoretical work in the area of social learning.
Proposition 3.10. For the social learning game with fully observable histories Γ(At−1) and
a signal structure F satisfying (A1)-(A4), state dependent thresholds θˆn(ω) converge with
limn→∞ θˆn(l) = 1, limn→∞ θˆn(h) = −1, and complete learning occurs.
The focus of this work, social learning in an environment with a limited history of
observation, also features complete learning in the more general setting.
Proposition 3.11. For the social learning game with limited observable histories Γ(at−1)
and a signal structure F satisfying (A1)-(A4), thresholds θ¯n if an−1 = 1 and
¯
θn if an−1 = 0
converge with limn→∞ θ¯n = −1, limn→∞
¯
θn = 1, and complete learning occurs.
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To avoid placing a technical burden on the analysis by restricting the signal structure in
ways that increase tractability but lack in obvious economic meaning, consider the following
intuitive assumption.
Assumption 3.5. Under limited histories with positional uncertainty θ¯n +
¯
θn = 0 for all n.
Under this assumption we have the general result of complete learning in an environment
of positional uncertainty.
Proposition 3.12. For the social learning game with limited observable histories Γ(at−1),
positional uncertainty µn, and a signal structure F satisfying (A1)-(A5), limn→∞ θ¯n = −1
and limn→∞
¯
θn = 1 if such limits exist. Moreover, if these limits exist then complete learning
occurs.
3.6 Concluding remarks
The traditional model of social learning offers powerfully intuitive results on how the courtship
of private information and observation leads to informed economic decision making. But this
marriage is only as strong as the assumptions it stands upon. In particular, if the assumptions
of fully observable histories and certainty about position in the sequence of actors come into
question, there are behavioral and welfare consequences that alter the learning dynamic. By
addressing this we gain a richer depiction of an environment in which agents learn from an
appreciably less learned starting point.
The introduction of limited observation of preceding actions to the standard social
learning model changes the integration of information, but the limit result of complete
learning remains. With agents only conditioning on the previous action, the threshold
equilibria take a predictable form, on average converging more quickly to the limit ensuring
the correct action. Despite this, the increased possibility of discarding information increases
the possibility for error, leading to a lower expected utility for each agent in finite time.
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Complete learning in the limit continues to hold even when agents are uncertain of
their position in the sequence. In fact, the threshold equilibria converge more quickly the
higher is the uncertainty over position, exacerbating the reduction in expected utility of the
limited history case. While the pace of learning in terms of welfare decreases with positional
uncertainty, complete learning in the limit does not depend on its existence or magnitude.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose agent n observes history Hn and receives signal θn.
Then n will choose an = 1 if
Pr(h|θn, Ht) ≥ Pr(l|θn, Ht) ⇐⇒ Pr(θn, Ht|h) Pr(h)
Pr(θn, Ht)
≥ Pr(θn, Ht|l) Pr(l)
Pr(θn, Ht)






is strictly increasing in θn there must be some θˆn for which Pr(h|θn, Ht) ≥
Pr(l|θn, Ht) if θn ≥ θˆn and Pr(h|θn, Ht) < Pr(l|θn, Ht) otherwise. Thus n follows a threshold
strategy.
Lemma 3.1. For a general signal structure Pr(θn ≤ θ|h) = Fh(θ) and Pr(θn ≤ θ|l) =
Fl(θ) that admit distribution functions fh, fl characterized by the monotone likelihood ratio






(1−Fh(θˆn−1))fl(θˆn−1) if an−1 = 1
Fl(θˆn−1)fh(θˆn−1)
Fh(θˆn−1)fl(θˆn−1)
if an−1 = 0













In the case of an−1 = 1, θn−1 ≥ θˆn−1 and
Pr(An−1|l) Pr(l)
Pr(An−1|h) Pr(h) =
Pr(θn−1 ≥ θˆn−1|l) Pr(An−2|l) Pr(l)
Pr(θn−1 ≥ θˆn−1|h) Pr(An−2|h) Pr(h)
=
(1− Fl(θˆn−1)) Pr(An−2|l) Pr(l)
(1− Fh(θˆn−1)) Pr(An−2|h) Pr(h)
=
(1− Fl(θˆn−1))fh(θˆn−1)fl(θˆn−1) Pr(An−2|h) Pr(h)















(1−Fh(θˆn−1))fl(θˆn−1) if an−1 = 1
Fl(θˆn−1)fh(θˆn−1)
Fh(θˆn−1)fl(θˆn−1)
if an−1 = 0
Proof of Proposition 2. Applying the result of lemma 1 to our canonical signal structure
defined by Fh(θ) =
1
4






(1− θˆn−1)2 12(1 + θˆn−1)
[1− 1
4
(1 + θˆn−1)2]12(1− θˆn−1)
=
(1− θˆn−1)(1 + θˆn−1)
3− 2θˆn−1 − θˆ2n−1
=
(1− θˆn−1)(1 + θˆn−1)




=⇒ θˆn = −1
2 + θˆn−1
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(1− θˆn−1)2]12(1 + θˆn−1)
1
4
(1 + θˆn−1)2 12(1− θˆn−1)
=
3 + 2θˆn−1 − θˆ2n−1
(1 + θˆn−1)(1− θˆn−1)
=
(3− θˆn−1)(1 + θˆn−1)




=⇒ θˆn = 1
2− θˆn−1





if an−1 = 1
1
2−θˆn−1 if an−1 = 0
Proof of Proposition 3. Given the recursive form of the threshold strategy determined













































1 + 2θˆn−1 + θˆ2n−1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
− 2− θˆn−1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
=
θˆ2n−1 + 3θˆn−1 − 1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
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so that
E[θˆn|θˆn−1, h]− θˆn−1 = θˆ
2
n−1 + 3θˆn−1 − 1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
− θˆn−1
=
θˆ2n−1 + 3θˆn−1 − 1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
− 4θˆn−1 − θˆ
3
n−1




n−1 − θˆn−1 − 1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
=
(θˆn−1 + 1)2(θˆn−1 − 1)
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
Since −1 ≤ θˆn−1 ≤ 1, all terms of E[θˆn|θˆn−1, h] − θˆn−1 are positive except (θˆn−1 − 1) ≤ 0
so that E[θˆn|θˆn−1, h] ≤ θˆn−1. Then conditional on ω = h, θˆn is a supermartingale bounded

















































(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
− 1− 2θˆn−1 + θˆ
2
n−1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
=
−θˆ2n−1 + 3θˆn−1 + 1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
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so that
E[θˆn|θˆn−1, l]− θˆn−1 = −θˆ
2
n−1 + 3θˆn−1 + 1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
− θˆn−1
=
−θˆ2n−1 + 3θˆn−1 + 1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
− 4θˆn−1 − θˆ
3
n−1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
=
θˆ3n−1 − θˆ2n−1 − θˆn−1 + 1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
=
(θˆn−1 + 1)(θˆn−1 − 1)2
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
Since −1 ≤ θˆn−1 ≤ 1 all terms are nonnegative so that E[θˆn|θˆn−1, l] ≥ θˆn−1. Then conditional
on ω = l, θˆn is a submartingale bounded above by 1 and thus must converge to a limit almost
everywhere.
Let θ¯ = limn→∞ θˆn(h) be the limit of the supermartingale θˆn conditional on the state
ω = h. Then
θ¯ = lim
n→∞
E[θˆn|θˆn−1, h] = lim
n→∞
θˆ2n−1 + 3θˆn−1 − 1
(2 + θˆn−1)(2− θˆn−1)
=⇒ θ¯ = θ¯
2 + 3θ¯ − 1
(2 + θˆ)(2− θ¯)
which reduces to (θ¯ + 1)2(θ¯ − 1) = 0. Then either θ¯ = 1 or θ¯ = −1. But as we saw above,
θˆn−1 = 0 if n = 1 so that E[θˆn|θˆn−1, h] ≤ 0 for all n ≥ 1. This only leaves θ¯ = −1.
Let
¯
θ = limn→∞ θˆn(l) be the limit of the submartingale θˆn conditional on the state ω = l.
Then
¯
θ = E[θˆn|θˆn−1, l] = lim
n→∞
−θˆ2n−1 + 3θˆn−1 + 1

















θ − 1)2 = 0. Then either
¯
θ = 1 or
¯
θ = −1. But as we saw above,
θˆn−1 = 0 if n = 1 so that E[θˆn|θˆn−1, l] ≥ 0 for all n ≥ 1. This only leaves
¯
θ = 1.
Finally, Pr(an = 1|h) = Pr(θn > θˆn|h) = 1 − Fh(θˆn) = 1 − 14(1 + θˆn)2. Similarly
Pr(an = 0|l) = Pr(θn ≤ θˆn|l) = Fl(θˆn) = 1− 14(1− θˆn)2. So then
lim
n→∞
































so that limn→∞ Pr(an = 1|h) = limn→∞ Pr(an = 0|l) = 1 and complete learning occurs.








An−2∈An−2 Pr(an−1|An−2, l) Pr(An−2|l) Pr(l)∑





An−3∈An−3 Pr(an−1|an−2, An−3, l) Pr(an−2|An−3, l) Pr(An−3|l)∑
an−2∈{0,1}
∑
An−3∈An−3 Pr(an−1|an−2, An−3, h) Pr(an−2|An−3, h) Pr(An−3|h)






An−3∈An−3 Pr(an−1|an−2, l) Pr(an−2|An−3, l) Pr(An−3|l)∑
an−2∈{0,1}
∑





An−3∈An−3 Pr(an−2|An−3, l) Pr(An−3|l)∑
an−2∈{0,1} Pr(an−1|an−2, h)
∑
An−3∈An−3 Pr(an−2|An−3, h) Pr(An−3|h)
=
∑
an−2∈{0,1} Pr(an−1|an−2, l) Pr(an−2|l)∑
an−2∈{0,1} Pr(an−1|an−2, h) Pr(an−2|h)
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If thresholds θ¯n−1 and
¯




Pr(an−2 = 1|l) Pr(l)








Pr(an−2 = 0|l) Pr(l)
Pr(an−2 = 0|h) Pr(h)














Pr(an−1|an−2 = 1, l) Pr(an−2 = 1|l) Pr(l) + Pr(an−1|an−2 = 0, l) Pr(an−2 = 0|l) Pr(l)
Pr(an−1|an−2 = 1, h) Pr(an−2 = 1|h) Pr(h) + Pr(an−1|an−2 = 0, h) Pr(an−2 = 0|h) Pr(h)
=
Pr(an−1|an−2 = 1, l) Pr(an−2 = 1|l) Pr(l) + Pr(an−1|an−2 = 0, l) fh(¯θn−1)fl(
¯
θn−1)
Pr(an−2 = 0|h) Pr(h)
Pr(an−1|an−2 = 1, h) fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1)Pr(an−2 = 1|l) Pr(l) + Pr(an−1|an−2 = 0, h) Pr(an−2 = 0|h) Pr(h)
As noted, θ¯2 = −12 and ¯θ2 =
1
2
so that θ¯2 +
¯
θ2 = 0. Also, Pr(a1 = 1|l) = (1 − Fl(0)) = 14
and Pr(a1 = 0|h) = Fh(0) = 14 so that Pr(a1 = 1|l) = Pr(a1 = 0|h). Conjecture that
θ¯n−1 +
¯





fh(θ¯n−1)[Pr(an−1|an−2 = 1, l)fl(
¯





θn−1)[Pr(an−1|an−2 = 1, h)fl(θ¯n−1) + Pr(an−1|an−2 = 0, h)fh(θ¯n−1)]
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fh(θ¯n−1)[(1− Fl(θ¯n−1))fl(−θ¯n−1) + (1− Fl(−θ¯n−1))fh(−θ¯n−1)]
fl(−θ¯n−1)[(1− Fh(θ¯n−1))fl(θ¯n−1) + (1− Fh(−θ¯n−1))fh(θ¯n−1)]
and by symmetry of the signal functions
=
(1− Fl(θ¯n−1))fh(θ¯n−1) + Fh(θ¯n−1)fl(θ¯n−1)
(1− Fh(θ¯n−1))fl(θ¯n−1) + Fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1)




















Fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1) + (1− Fh(θ¯n−1))fl(θ¯n−1)
Fh(θ¯n−1)fl(θ¯n−1) + (1− Fl(θ¯n−1))fh(θ¯n−1)
For our canonical signal structure defined by Fh(θ) =
1
4








(1− θ¯n−1)2 12(1 + θ¯n−1) + 14(1 + θ¯n−1)2 12(1− θ¯n−1)
[1− 1
4
(1 + θ¯n−1)2]12(1− θ¯n−1) + [1− 14(1− θ¯n−1)2]12(1 + θ¯n−1)
=
(1− θ¯n−1)2(1 + θ¯n−1) + (1 + θ¯n−1)2(1− θ¯n−1)
(3− 2θ¯n−1 − θ¯2n−1)(1− θ¯n−1) + (3 + 2θ¯n−1 − θ¯2n−1)(1 + θ¯n−1)
=
(1− θ¯n−1)(1 + θ¯n−1)[(1− θ¯n−1) + (1 + θ¯n−1)]




=⇒ θˆn = −1
2
(1 + θ¯2n−1)






(1− θ¯n−1)2]12(1 + θ¯n−1) + [1− 14(1 + θ¯n−1)2]12(1− θ¯n−1)
1
4
(1 + θ¯n−1)2 12(1− θ¯n−1) + 14(1− θ¯n−1)2 12(1 + θ¯n−1)
=
(3 + 2θ¯n−1 − θ¯2n−1)(1 + θ¯n−1) + (3− 2θ¯n−1 − θ¯2n−1)(1− θ¯n−1)
(1 + θ¯n−1)2(1− θ¯n−1) + (1− θ¯n−1)2(1 + θ¯n−1)
=
6− 2θ¯2n−1 + θ¯n−1(4θ¯n−1)




=⇒ θˆn = 1
2
(1 + θ¯2n−1)





(1 + θ¯2n−1) if an−1 = 1
1
2
(1 + θ¯2n−1) if an−1 = 0
Finally, recall that we conjectured that θ¯n−1 +
¯
θn−1 = 0 and that Pr(an−2 = 1|l) = Pr(an−2 =
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0|h) and the resulting threshold θˆn also satisfied θ¯n +
¯
θn = 0. Moreover,
Pr(an−1 = 1|l) = Pr(an−1 = 1|an−2 = 1, l) Pr(an−2 = 1|l)
+ Pr(an−1 = 1|an−2 = 0, l) Pr(an−2 = 0|l)
= (1− Fl(θ¯n−1)) Pr(an−2 = 1|l) + (1− Fl(
¯
θn−1))(1− Pr(an−2 = 1|l))
and by symmetry of Fl and Fh and θ¯n−1 +
¯
θn−1 = 0 this becomes
= Fh(
¯
θn−1)) Pr(an−2 = 1|l) + Fh(θ¯n−1)(1− Pr(an−2 = 1|l))
= Fh(θ¯n−1) + Pr(an−2 = 1|l))(Fh(
¯
θn−1)− Fh(θ¯n−1))
Pr(an−1 = 0|h) = Pr(an−1 = 0|an−2 = 1, h) Pr(an−2 = 1|h)
+ Pr(an−1 = 0|an−2 = 0, h) Pr(an−2 = 0|h)
= Fh(θ¯n−1)(1− Pr(an−2 = 0|h)) + Fh(
¯
θn−1) Pr(an−2 = 0|h)




Pr(an−1 = 1|l)− Pr(an−1 = 0|h) = (Pr(an−2 = 1|l)− Pr(an−2 = 0|h))(Fh(
¯
θn−1)− Fh(θ¯n−1))
and Pr(an−1 = 1|l) = Pr(an−1 = 0|h) since Pr(an−2 = 1|l) = Pr(an−2 = 0|h). So by
induction, θ¯n +
¯
θn = 0 and Pr(an = 1|l) = Pr(an = 0|h) for all n.
Lemma 3.2. In the case of limited histories in the sense that An = an, if Pr(an−1 = 0|l) =
Pr(an−1 = 1|h) then
Pr(an−1 = 1|h) = fl(θ¯n)
fl(θ¯n) + fh(θ¯n)
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Proof. As noted above, in the case of limited histories beliefs are recursively related according
to
Pr(an−1 = 1|h) = fl(θ¯n)
fh(θ¯n)
Pr(an−1 = 1|l) = fl(θ¯n)
fh(θ¯n)
(1− Pr(an−1 = 0|l))
and with Pr(an−1 = 0|l) = Pr(an−1 = 1|h),
Pr(an−1 = 1|h) = fl(θ¯n)
fl(θ¯n) + fh(θ¯n)
Proof of Proposition 5. We found above that in equilibrium θ¯1 = 0 and θ¯n = −12(1 +
θ¯2n−1) for n ≥ 2 so that
θ¯n+1 − θ¯n = −1
2





Then θ¯n is a decreasing sequence bounded below by −1 and as such must converge. Moreover
lim
n→∞





2 = 0 ⇐⇒ lim
n→∞
θ¯n = −1





We showed in the previous proposition that Pr(an−1 = 1|l) = Pr(an−1 = 0|h). But since
Pr(an−1 = 1|l) = 1− Pr(an−1 = 0|l) and Pr(an−1 = 0|h) = 1− Pr(an−1 = 1|h) it must also
be that Pr(an−1 = 0|l) = Pr(an−1 = 1|h).
By lemma 2,














Then limn→∞ Pr(an−1 = 1|h) = limn→∞ 12(1 − θ¯n) = 1. Since Pr(an−1 = 0|l) = Pr(an−1 =
1|h), limn→∞ Pr(an−1 = 0|1) = 1. Thus complete learning occurs.
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume Pr(ai−2) = 12 given no a priori information possible








i (Pr(ai−1|l) + Pr(ai−1|h))
Pr(ai−1|l) + Pr(ai−1|h) =
∑
ai−2∈A




= Fl(θ¯n−1) Pr(ai−2 = 1|l) + Fl(
¯
θn−1) Pr(ai−2 = 0|l)
+ Fh(θ¯n−1) Pr(ai−2 = 1|h) + Fh(
¯
θn−1) Pr(ai−2 = 0|h)
= Fl(θ¯n−1) Pr(ai−2 = 1|l) + Fl(
¯
θn−1)(1− Pr(ai−2 = 1|l))
+ Fh(θ¯n−1) Pr(an−2 = 1|h) + Fh(
¯
θn−1)(1− Pr(ai−2 = 1|h))
If Pr(ai−2|l) Pr(l) + Pr(ai−2|h) Pr(h) = 12 , Pr(ai−2|l) + Pr(ai−2|h) = 1 and
= Fl(θ¯n−1) Pr(ai−2 = 1|l) + Fl(
¯
θn−1)(1− Pr(ai−2 = 1|l))
+ Fh(θ¯n−1)(1− Pr(ai−2 = 1|l)) + Fh(
¯
θn−1) Pr(ai−2 = 1|l)
= Pr(ai−2 = 1|l)[Fl(θ¯n−1)− Fl(
¯



















































− Pr(ai−2 = 1|l)
))
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− Pr(ai−2 = 1|l)
))





















































θn = 0, for each i












− Pr(ai−2 = 1|l)
))
= 1















N−1 for i 6= n then

















































N(γ − 2) + 1













Pr(an−1 = 1|l) + θ¯1 − Nγ − 1
2(N − 1)

















N(3γ − 2)− 1














Pr(an−1 = 0|l) +
¯
θ1 − 3(Nγ − 1)
2(N − 1)
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Lemma 3.3. For the canonical signal structure, if θ¯n +
¯
θn = 0, then
Pr(an = 1|l) = 1
4
(1 + θ¯n)
2 − θ¯n Pr(an−1 = 1|l) and








θn Pr(an−1 = 0|l)
Proof.
Pr(an = 1|l) = Pr(an = 1|an−1 = 1, l) Pr(an−1 = 1|l) + Pr(an = 1|an−1 = 0, l) Pr(an−1 = 0|l)
= (1− Fl(θ¯n)) Pr(an−1 = 1|l) + (1− Fl(
¯
θn)) Pr(an−1 = 0|l)
= (1− Fl(θ¯n)) Pr(an−1 = 1|l) + Fh(θ¯n)(1− Pr(an−1 = 1|l))


















2 − θ¯n Pr(an−1 = 1|l)






(1− θ¯n)2 − θ¯n Pr(an−1 = 0|l) = 1
4












θn Pr(an−1 = 0|l)





Pr(an−1 = 1|l) + θ¯1− Nγ−12(N−1) so that





(Pr(an = 1|l)− Pr(an−1 = 1|l))
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From lemma 3, Pr(an = 1|l) = 14(1 + θ¯n)2 − θ¯n Pr(an−1 = 1|l) and this becomes

























1 + θ¯n − 4 Pr(an−1 = 1|l)
]












This is satisfied if θ¯ = −1. If θ¯ > −1 then
4 lim
n→∞








Pr(an−1 = 0|l) +
¯









(Pr(an = 0|l)− Pr(an−1 = 0|l))






















































This is satisfied if
¯
θ = 1. If
¯
θ < 1 then
4 lim
n→∞
Pr(an = 0|l) = 3 +
¯
θ
































If θ¯n → θ¯, then Pr(an−1 = 1|l)→ limn→∞ Pr(an = 1|l),
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai = 1|l)→ N limn→∞ Pr(an =
1|l), and
θ¯ = 2 lim
n→∞







θ = 2 lim
n→∞
Pr(an = 0|l)− 1
In case (i) θ¯ = −1 and
¯
θ = 1 so limn→∞ Pr(an = 1|l) = 0 and limn→∞ Pr(an = 0|l) = 1.
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In case (ii)
θ¯ = 2 lim
n→∞
Pr(an = 1|l)− 1 = 1
2










θ = 2 lim
n→∞











θ = 1. From above Pr(an = 1|h) = 1 − Pr(an = 1|l), and by the definition
of the limit, limn→∞ Pr(an = 1|h) = 1 − limn→∞ Pr(an = 1|l) = 1 − 14(1 + θ¯) = 1 and
limn→∞ Pr(an = 0|l) = 14(3 + ¯θ) = 1
Thus in either case limn→∞ Pr(an = 1|h) = 1 and limn→∞ Pr(an = 0|l) = 1 so complete
learning occurs.
Proof of Proposition 8. From proposition 6,
θ¯1 =
N(γ − 2) + 1












Pr(an−1 = 1|l) + θ¯1 − Nγ − 1
2(N − 1)





i=0 Pr(ai = 1|l) = 0.
Thus limN→∞ θ¯1 = −2−γ2 and limN→∞ θ¯n = 2γ Pr(an−1 = 1|l) − 2−γ2 − γ2 = 2γ Pr(an−1 =
1|l) − 1. From lemma 3, Pr(an−1 = 1|l) = 14(1 + θ¯n−1)2 − θ¯n−1 Pr(an−2 = 1|l). Moreover,
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limN→∞ θ¯n−1 = 2γ Pr(an−2 = 1|l)− 1 which implies Pr(an−2 = 1|l) = θ¯n−1+12γ and
Pr(an−1 = 1|l) = 1
4











(γ + 2θ¯n−1(γ − 1) + θ¯2n−1(γ − 2))
Then as N →∞,











γ + θ¯2n−1(γ − 2)
)












Thus limN→∞ θ¯n = −12(1 + θ¯2n−1)− 1−γ2 (1 + θ¯n−1)2 and since ¯θn = −θ¯n for all n, limN→∞¯θn =
1
2




Proof of proposition 9. By definition
E[u(θ)|Hn, h] = Pr(an = 1|h)− Pr(an = 1|l) = 1− 2 Pr(an = 1|l)
From proposition 8, Pr(an = 1|l) = 14γ (γ + 2θ¯n(γ − 1) + θ¯2n(γ − 2)), so that















(1 + θ¯2n) +
1− γ
2γ
(θ¯2n + 2θ¯n − 1)
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Lemma 3.4. If fh(θ)
fl(θ)
exhibits the strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property in the sense










for all θ ∈ supp(F )◦
(ii) Fl strictly First Order Stochastically Dominates Fh in that Fl(θ) > Fh(θ) for all θ ∈
supp(F )◦
Proof. Let θ0, θ1 ∈ supp(F )◦ with θ1 > θ0. Then by the MLRP fh(θ1)fl(θ0) > fh(θ0)fl(θ1)






























, or Fl(θ1) > Fh(θ1) for any interior θ1.
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(1−Fh(θˆn−1))fl(θˆn−1) if an−1 = 1
Fl(θˆn−1)fh(θˆn−1)
Fh(θˆn−1)fl(θˆn−1)








= Pr(an−1 = 0|l)Fl(θˆn−1)fh(θˆn−1)
Fh(θˆn−1)fl(θˆn−1)






Pr(an−1 = 0|l) Fl(θˆn−1)
Fh(θˆn−1)






















































Fh(θˆn−1)(1−Fh(θˆn−1)) , and by strict First Order Stochastic
Dominance this is strictly positive for interior signals θ. Then since it is a submartingale
the likelihood ratio fh(θˆn)
fl(θˆn)
either converges to a limit or diverges, but since Fl(θ)−Fh(θ) > 0
for interior signals it cannot converge to a limit and hence must diverge. By the monotone
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likelihood ratio property, since limn→∞
fh(θˆn)
fl(θˆn)







= Pr(an−1 = 0|h)Fh(θˆn−1)fl(θˆn−1)
Fl(θˆn−1)fh(θˆn−1)


































































a submartingale conditional on ω = h. Strict FOSD again implies that the likelihood ratio
diverges so that θˆn = −1.
Together these results imply
lim
n→∞
Pr(an = 0|l) = lim
n→∞
Fl(θˆn) = F (1) = 1
lim
n→∞
Pr(an = 1|h) = lim
n→∞
(1− Fh(θˆn)) = 1− F (−1) = 1
so that complete learning occurs.
Lemma 3.5. Under the assumptions of social learning with limited history and general
signals as in proposition 8, decision thresholds θ¯n if an−1 = 1 and
¯
θn if an−1 = 0 satisfy
θ¯1 < 0 and θ¯n +
¯
θn = 0. Moreover Pr(an−2 = 1|l) = Pr(an−2 = 0|h) for all n.
Proof. Consider the decision of the first agent. By the assumption of symmetry on Fl, Fh,
agent 0 will play a0 = 1 if and only if θ ≥ 0. As above, with prior Pr(h) = 12 , agent 1 will
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then set thresholds θ¯1 if a0 = 1 and
¯

























< 1 since Fl(0) > Fh(0) by strict FOSD. Thus θ¯1 < 0. Also, since symmetry



















. Then by the strict monotonicity of the likelihood ratio,
¯
θ1 = −θ¯1.
In the base case of n = 2, θ¯n−1 +
¯
θn−1 = 0 and Pr(an−2 = 1|l) = 1 − Fl(0) = Fh(0) =
Pr(an−2 = 0|h). Conjecture θ¯n−1 +
¯
θn−1 = 0 and Pr(an−2 = 1|l) = Pr(an−2 = 0|h) for general
n ≥ 2. As we in the proof of proposition 3 this implies that for general n the agent will set
threshold θ¯n if an−1 = 1 and
¯




(1− Fl(θ¯n−1))fh(θ¯n−1) + Fh(θ¯n−1)fl(θ¯n−1)
(1− Fh(θ¯n−1))fl(θ¯n−1) + Fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1)








Fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1) + (1− Fh(θ¯n−1))fl(θ¯n−1)








(1− Fl(θ¯n−1))fh(θ¯n−1) + Fh(θ¯n−1)fl(θ¯n−1)





















Pr(an−1 = 1|l) = Pr(an−1 = 1|an−2 = 1, l) Pr(an−2 = 1|l)
+ Pr(an−1 = 1|an−2 = 0, l) Pr(an−2 = 0|l)
= (1− Fl(θ¯n−1)) Pr(an−2 = 1|l) + (1− Fl(
¯
θn−1))(1− Pr(an−2 = 1|l))
and by symmetry of Fl and Fh and θ¯n−1 +
¯
θn−1 = 0 this becomes
= Fh(
¯
θn−1)) Pr(an−2 = 1|l) + Fh(θ¯n−1)(1− Pr(an−2 = 1|l))
= Fh(θ¯n−1) + Pr(an−2 = 1|l))(Fh(
¯
θn−1)− Fh(θ¯n−1))
Pr(an−1 = 0|h) = Pr(an−1 = 0|an−2 = 1, h) Pr(an−2 = 1|h)
+ Pr(an−1 = 0|an−2 = 0, h) Pr(an−2 = 0|h)
= Fh(θ¯n−1)(1− Pr(an−2 = 0|h)) + Fh(
¯
θn−1) Pr(an−2 = 0|h)




Pr(an−1 = 1|l)− Pr(an−1 = 0|h) = (Pr(an−2 = 1|l)− Pr(an−2 = 0|h))(Fh(
¯
θn−1)− Fh(θ¯n−1))
and Pr(an−1 = 1|l) = Pr(an−1 = 0|h) since Pr(an−2 = 1|l) = Pr(an−2 = 0|h) by our induction
conjecture. So by induction, θ¯n +
¯
θn = 0 and Pr(an = 1|l) = Pr(an = 0|h) for all n.
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(1− Fl(θ¯n−1))fh(θ¯n−1) + Fh(θ¯n−1)fl(θ¯n−1)




fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1)− Fl(θ¯n−1)fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1) + Fh(θ¯n−1)fl(θ¯n−1)2
fl(θ¯n−1)[(1− Fh(θ¯n−1))fl(θ¯n−1) + Fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1)]
− fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1)− Fh(θ¯n−1)fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1) + Fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1)
2
fl(θ¯n−1)[(1− Fh(θ¯n−1))fl(θ¯n−1) + Fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1)]
=
(fh(θ¯n−1)− fl(θ¯n−1))(Fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1) + Fh(θ¯n−1)fl(θ¯n−1))





≤ 0 ⇐⇒ fh(θ¯n−1) ≤ fl(θ¯n−1). Symmetry about 0 implies fh(0)fl(0) = 1
and with the monotone likelihood ratio assumption fh(θ¯n−1) ≤ fl(θ¯n−1) for θ¯n−1 ≤ 0. Thus
the likelihood ratio fh(θ¯n−1) ≤ fl(θ¯n−1) is a decreasing sequence bounded below so it must
converge. Moreover, strict FOSD implies that fh(θ¯n−1) < fl(θ¯n−1) if θ¯n−1 < 0. As we showed
above θ¯1 < 0 and by the monotonicity of the likelihood ratio θn < θ¯n−1 for all n ≥ 1. Then
the likelihood ratio strictly decreases in n until Fl(θ¯n−1)fh(θ¯n−1) + Fh(θ¯n−1)fl(θ¯n−1) = 0, or















= 1 . By lemma 3 Pr(an = 1|l) = Pr(an =
0|h) so limn→∞ Pr(an = 0|l) = 1 and complete learning occurs.
Lemma 3.6. Under mutual symmetry of Fl and Fh, if θ¯n +
¯
θn = 0 for all n
Pr(an = 1|l)− Pr(an−1 = 1|l) = Fh(θ¯n)− Pr(an−1 = 1|l)[Fl(θ¯n) + Fh(θ¯n)]
Pr(an = 1|h)− Pr(an−1 = 1|h) = Fl(θ¯n)− Pr(an−1 = 1|h)[Fl(θ¯n) + Fh(θ¯n)]
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and
Pr(an = 1|l) Pr(an−1 = 1|h)− Pr(an−1 = 1|l) Pr(an = 1|h)
= Fh(θ¯n) Pr(an−1 = 1|h)− Fl(θ¯n) Pr(an−1 = 1|l)
Proof.
Pr(an = 1|l) = Pr(an = 1|an−1 = 1, l) Pr(an−1 = 1|l) + Pr(an = 1|an−1 = 0, l) Pr(an−1 = 0|l)
= (1− Fl(θ¯n)) Pr(an−1 = 1|l) + (1− Fl(
¯
θn)) Pr(an−1 = 0|l)
= (1− Fl(θ¯n)) Pr(an−1 = 1|l) + Fh(θ¯n)(1− Pr(an−1 = 1|l))
= Fh(θ¯n) + Pr(an−1 = 1|l)(1− Fl(θ¯n)− Fh(θ¯n))
and
Pr(an = 1|h) = Pr(an = 1|an−1 = 1, h) Pr(an−1 = 1|h) + Pr(an = 1|an−1 = 0, h) Pr(an−1 = 0|h)
= (1− Fh(θ¯n)) Pr(an−1 = 1|h) + (1− Fh(
¯
θn)) Pr(an−1 = 0|h)
= (1− Fh(θ¯n)) Pr(an−1 = 1|h) + Fl(θ¯n)(1− Pr(an−1 = 1|h))
= Fl(θ¯n) + Pr(an−1 = 1|h)(1− Fl(θ¯n)− Fh(θ¯n))
The first two desired equalities are easily obtained by rearranging the above equations while
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the third is given by
Pr(an = 1|l) Pr(an−1 = 1|h)− Pr(an−1 = 1|l) Pr(an = 1|h)
= [Fh(θ¯n) + Pr(an−1 = 1|l)(1− Fl(θ¯n)− Fh(θ¯n))] Pr(an−1 = 1|h)
− Pr(an−1 = 1|l)[Fl(θ¯n) + Pr(an−1 = 1|h)(1− Fl(θ¯n)− Fh(θ¯n))]
= Fh(θ¯n) Pr(an−1 = 1|h)− Fl(θ¯n) Pr(an−1 = 1|l)
Lemma 3.7. If θˆn converges to a limit then Pr(an|l) and Pr(an|h) also converge.
Proof. By lemma 7, Pr(an = 1|l)−Pr(an−1 = 1|l) = Fh(θ¯n)−Pr(an−1 = 1|l)(Fl(θ¯n)+Fh(θ¯n)).
If Pr(an|l) does not converge, let ε > 0 for which for any N there is always some n ≥ N with
|Pr(an = 1|l)− Pr(an−1 = 1|l)| > ε. Suppose Pr(an = 1|l)− Pr(an−1 = 1|l) > ε. Then





Pr(an+1 = 1|l)− Pr(an = 1|l) = Fh(θ¯n+1)− Pr(an = 1|l)(Fl(θ¯n+1) + Fh(θ¯n+1))
= Fh(θ¯n+1)− (Fh(θ¯n) + Pr(an−1 = 1|l)(1− Fl(θ¯n)− Fh(θ¯n))(Fl(θ¯n+1) + Fh(θ¯n+1))
= Fh(θ¯n+1)− Fh(θ¯n)(Fl(θ¯n+1) + Fh(θ¯n+1))− Pr(an−1 = 1|l)(1− Fl(θ¯n)
− Fh(θ¯n))(Fl(θ¯n+1) + Fh(θ¯n+1))
> Fh(θ¯n+1)− Fh(θ¯n)(Fl(θ¯n+1) + Fh(θ¯n+1))






= Fh(θ¯n+1)− Fh(θ¯n)(Fl(θ¯n+1) + Fh(θ¯n+1)) + Fh(θ¯n)(Fl(θ¯n+1) + Fh(θ¯n+1))





+ ε(1− Fl(θ¯n)− Fh(θ¯n))(Fl(θ¯n+1) + Fh(θ¯n+1))
Given the convergence of θ¯n, n can be made large enough that
Fh(θ¯n+1)Fl(θ¯n)− Fh(θ¯n)Fl(θ¯n+1) >
− ε(1− Fl(θ¯n)− Fh(θ¯n))(Fl(θ¯n+1) + Fh(θ¯n+1))(Fl(θ¯n) + Fh(θ¯n))
so that Pr(an+1|l) > Pr(an = 1|l) for n ≥ N . Thus Pr(an = 1|l) is an increasing sequence,
bounded above and must converge. If Pr(an = 1|l)−Pr(an−1 = 1|l) < −ε then Pr(an = 1|l)
is a decreasing sequence bounded below and must converge. Since Pr(an = 0|l) = 1 −
Pr(an = 1|l) this must converge as well. Finally, an analogous proof shows the convergence
of Pr(an|h).
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(γ − µ) Pr(an−1|l) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|l)
(γ − µ) Pr(an−1|h) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|h)






(γ − µ) Pr(an|l) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|l)
(γ − µ) Pr(an|h) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|h)
− (γ − µ) Pr(an−1|l) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|l)




[(γ − µ) Pr(an|l) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|l)][(γ − µ) Pr(an−1|h) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|h)]
[(γ − µ) Pr(an−1|h) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|h)][(γ − µ) Pr(an|h) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|h)]
− [(γ − µ) Pr(an−1|l) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|l)][(γ − µ) Pr(an|h) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|h)]
[(γ − µ) Pr(an−1|h) + µ
∑N−1




(γ − µ)2[Pr(an|l) Pr(an−1|h)− Pr(an−1|l) Pr(an|h)]
[(γ − µ) Pr(an−1|h) + µ
∑N−1










[(γ − µ) Pr(an−1|h) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|h)][(γ − µ) Pr(an|h) + µ
∑N−1
i=0 Pr(ai|h)]
and with the results in lemma 7 this becomes
=
(γ − µ)2[Fh(θ¯n) Pr(an−1 = 1|h)− Fl(θ¯n) Pr(an−1 = 1|l)]
[(γ − µ) Pr(an−1|h) + µ
∑N−1






i=0 Pr(ai|h)(Fh(θ¯n)− Pr(an−1 = 1|l)[Fl(θ¯n) + Fh(θ¯n)])
]
[(γ − µ) Pr(an−1|h) + µ
∑N−1






i=0 Pr(ai|l)(Fl(θ¯n)− Pr(an−1 = 1|h)[Fl(θ¯n) + Fh(θ¯n)])
]
[(γ − µ) Pr(an−1|h) + µ
∑N−1






2[Fh(θ¯) Pr(a = 1|h)− Fl(θ¯) Pr(a = 1|l)]




Pr(a|h)(Fh(θ¯)− Pr(a = 1|l)[Fl(θ¯) + Fh(θ¯)])
]
[γ Pr(a|h) + Pr(a|h)][γ Pr(a|h) + Pr(a|h)]
−γ
[
Pr(a|l)(Fl(θ¯)− Pr(a = 1|h)[Fl(θ¯) + Fh(θ¯)])
]
[γ Pr(a|h) + Pr(a|h)][γ Pr(a|h) + Pr(a|h)]
=
γ(1 + γ)[Fh(θ¯) Pr(a = 1|h)− Fl(θ¯) Pr(a = 1|l)]




















Pr(an−1 = 1|h) =
Pr(a = 1|l)









< 1 for all interior θ and by symmetry and the MLRP fh(θ)
fl(θ)
> 1




for all interior θ so the only remaining





that θ¯ = −1.
















so that limn→∞ Pr(an = 1|h) = limn→∞ Pr(an = 0|l) = 1 and complete learning occurs.
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